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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse utilise la théorie du furetage afin d'étudier les problèmes reliés 
au marché du travail aux pays développés et en voie de développement. 
Le premier chapitre contribue à la littérature récente sur les fluctuations du 
chômage à travers l'élaboration d'un modèle de concurrence monopolistique. Pour 
la raison que la procyciicalité de l'entrée des firmes implique la contracyciicalité 
de la marge de profit, suite à un choc positif de la productivité du travail, l'aug­
mentation du profit des firmes existantes attirent l'entrée des nouvelles firmes. En 
entrant, ces dernières créent de nouveaux postes de vacance. Les firmes monopolis­
tiques existantes font face à la nouvelle compétition y répondent en limitant moins 
leur output. Ces deux effets qui entraînent plus de postes vacants constituent un 
mécanisme d'amplification effectif pour rapprocher le modèle aux données. À tra­
vers les différentes stratégies de calibration pour tester la sensibilité des résultats, 
nous constatons que le modèle peut expliquer près de 50% de la volatilité trouvée 
dans les données. 
Le second chapitre se concentre sur les effets du système d'enregistrement 
des ménages (Hukou) en Chine sur son marché du travail. Dans un contexte 
d 'hétérogénéité des travailleurs, si le gouvernement chinois relâche cette loi (soit 
en permettant plus de résidents ruraux à vivre dans un lieu urbain ou soit en ne 
forçant pas les non-résidents de fournir leur statut Hukou), le taux de chômage 
diminuerait et plus particulièrement le bien-être social s'accroîtrait. 
Le troisième chapitre expliquerait en quoi des travailleurs ayant les mêmes 
caractéristiques sont rémunérés différemment. Le mp.canisme se veut de l'infor­
mation asymétrique appliquée sur les firmes et travailleurs, et la négociation de 
type offre à prendre ou à laisser. Ceci avec le risque de séparation impliquent les 
firmes à productivité élevée s'engagent à offrir des salaires généreux. Quant aux 
travailleurs à faible productivité, ils ne demandent que des salaires modestes. C'est 
un mécanisme qui disperse la distribution des salaires. Les résultats numériques 
montrent que la dispersion salariale générée par le modèle réconcilie avec celle 
trouvée dans les données. 
Mots clés : théorie du furetage, fluctuations du chômage, politique du 
marché du travail, dispersion salariale. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses the search and matching theory to study the labor market. 
It has three chapters covering the following topics: the cycle behaviour of unem­
ployment and vacancy; effects of labor market policy in developing countries; and 
wage dispersion among workers having similar characteristics. 
The first chapter contributes to solutions available in recent literature on 
the unemployment volatility puzzle through developing a very simple monopol­
istic competition mode!. The key element that helps us to get more volatility in 
labor market variables is procyclical entry of firms that produces countercyclical 
markups. Following a positive productivity shock, vacancies increase and unem­
ployment falls not just because of the entry of new firms, but also because existing 
firms restrict their output less and hire more since they are now face competition 
from more firm. Under plausible parameterizations, our model simulations can 
reach up to 50% of volatility of labor market key variables found in the data. 
The second studies the effects of Chinese Hukou system of household regis­
tration (the law that limits migration the rural to the urban areas and vice-versa) 
on labor market outcomes. 'vVe find that if the Hukou system of household re­
gistration is relaxed by either decreasing the law enforcement or allowing more 
people to live in the city, urban unemployment rate would be reduced. More re­
laxed laws wouId help the urban sector become more attractive to rural residents, 
so firms hi ring both illegal andlegal Hukou status would benefit more from illegal 
worker since the rent firms extract from illegal workers is higher than that from 
legal workers and this in tum would induce firms to create more vacant positions. 
The third chapter proves that within a two-side asymmetric information 
environment, the take-it-or-leave-it offer mechanism can effectively explain why 
worker having similar characteristics are paid differently. The reason is through 
possessing private information, both firms and workers will make only modest 
wage offers to avoid separation, a mechanism that disperses the wage distribution. 
Key words: search and matching theory; unemployment volatility; labor 
market policy in developing countries; wage dispersion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the theories that could help explain successfully the labor market function 
is the standard Mortensen et Pissarides (1994) search and matching mode!. Since 
it was introduced, it has been widely employed in modern labor economics thanks 
to its tractability and ricil implications. The aim of this thesis is to apply the 
standard model in explaining sorne of the labor market issues related to both 
developed and developing countries. Our studies coyer only two countries: the 
United-States and China. 
In the first chapter, we address the inability of the standard modcl to match 
fluctuations in labor market data. Despite the success of the model in terms of 
labor market policy applied in the most developed countries, it does however, 
under plausible parameter, fail to reach empirical labor market volatility levels, 
known as the unemployment volatility puzzle (Shi,mer (200Sa)). Numerous works 
have attempted to solve this puzzle, and a great deal of progress has been made. 
We explore a different mechanism through the development of a very simple 
model of monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz developed by Ebell et Haefke 
(2009). The originality is the adaptation of competition to ail sectors where each 
sector has a certain number of competing firms that respect the free entry condi­
tion. The extended model allows the markups to be variable instead of constant 
as in the Dixit-Stiglitz mode!. The intuition of why adding monopolistic com­
petition could help amplifying the unemployment volatility is that monopolistic 
firms charge a price tbat is higher than their marginal cost by an amount eqnal 
to the markups. These latter are a decreasing function of the endogenous number 
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of competing firms in the goods sector. In other words, a procyclical number of 
active firms is associated with countercyclical markups. Thus, following a positive 
productivity shock, vacancies increase and unemployment falls not just because 
of the entry of new firms, but also because existing firms restrict their output less 
and hire more since they are now face competition from more firms. 
The fact that little has been done to explore the standard model in developing 
countries context, especially in China, motivates the study exposed in Chapter 
2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide sorne policy recommendations to the 
Chinese government in facing the present challenges in the country's urban labor 
market. In particular, the policy of controlling migration between the rural and 
urban sectors, known as the hukou system of household, registration, has been 
made of criticism by many prominent scholars. On the against-side, it has been 
proved to be responsible in rising social inequality and discriminating against 
migrant workers. On the for-side, it has helped in reducing pressures on ürban 
labor market. Regarding whether or not the system should be abolished still 
remains a greatest challenge faced by the Chinese government, although many 
reforms have been made since 1980s and 1990s. Our study makes a contribution 
to the main liteTature on Chinese labor market policy by developing a standard 
search equilibrium model in rural-urban migration context as in Laing (Park et 
Wang). We focus on the effects of relaxing the Hukow law on the urban labor 
market outcomes. The originality of our mode! is it allows workers be different in 
terms of productivity. Worker heterogeneity in our model can be thought of as 
not all workers would like to live in the countryside <'\TIr! not all workcrs woulù be 
qualified for urban sec:tor jobs. 
We find that if the Hllkou system of household registration is relaxed by either 
àecreasing the law enforcement or allowing more people to live in the city, urban 
llnemployment rate would be reduced and the social welfare would be improved. 
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In the face of quick economic and social change in China, it is likely that the Hukou 
system will not be maintained in the future and there is a greater likelihood that 
workers prefer to work in the urban sector vvhere more job opportunities with 
higher income, as compared to the rural sector. 
The last chapter tries to answer the question addressed in wage inequality lit­
erature: Why are similar workers paid differently? In fact, empirical research 
has shown that observable worker characteristics such as education, experience, 
age, etc can only explain up ta 30 percent of the wage variation. The remain­
ing unobservable (unexplained) accounts for 70 percent and is often referred to 
the residual wage dispersion. The question has attracted numerous theorists to 
provide a convincing theory of wage dispersion. Search theory offers two candidate 
wage determination models that can explain the observed dispersion. The first 
is a model in which each employer chooses a wage policy in imperfect Bertrand 
competition with other employers. The second is a bilateral Nash bargaining 
mode!. In both models, incomplete information about the wages offered by the 
heterogeneous firms becomes the source of wage differences. Nevertheless, a recent 
quantitative assessment done by Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) has shown that 
the wage dispersion levels predicted by search models are far from that found in 
the data. 
'\flle then modify an asymmetric information model introduced by Delacroix et 
Wasmer (2006) to address whether this kind of model can explain the dispersion 
of wage among similar workers. Our study is inspired by productivity dispersion 
among firms and utility dispersion among workers. Intuitively, if worker's utility 
from employment is high enough then he may want to lower his reservation wage. 
Similarly, more productive employers tend to offer generous wage offers than less 
productive ones. We find that under plausible parameter, asymmetric information 
along with take-it-or-leave-it bilateral bargaining mechanism can reach closely the 
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amount of wage dispersion found in the Current Population Survey. 
CHAPTER l
 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND
 
UNEMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS
 
In this paper, we contribute to solutions available in recent literat­
ure on the unemployment volatility puzzle through developing a very 
simple monopolistic competition mode!. The key element that helps 
us to get more volacility in labor market variables is procyclical entry 
of firms that produces countercyclical markups. Following a posit­
ive productivity shock, vacancies increase and unemployment falls not 
just because of the el1try of new firms, but also because existing firms 
restrict their output less and hire more since they are now face compet­
ition from more firm. Dnder plausible parameterizations, our model 
simulations can reach up to 50% of volatility of labor market key vari­
ables found in the data. 
Keywords: labor market volatility, endogenous competition, coun­
tercyclical markups 
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1.1 Introduction 
Unemployment fluctuations deserve intense study not only because they are asso­
ciated with human capital depreciation but also because of the related productive 
and social externalities. The standard matching model presented by tvIortensen et 
Pissarides (1994) (hereafter MP model) represents one of the main theories used 
to study the labor market, even though it fails to reach empirical labor market 
volatility levels, known as the unemployment volatility puzzle. The macro/labor 
literature has for sorne time tried to explain the fact with limited success. There 
are essentially two strands of explanations: rigid wage (as recently pursued by 
Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005)) or small match surplus (see Hagedorn et Man­
ovskii (2008)). On the one hand if wage is rigid, a positive labor productivity 
shocks will make output increase more proportionally than production cost and 
hence, more vaccLIlcies arise. Oh thé other hand îf the surplus in matches is small, 
small shocks suffice for dissolving many matches, implying large unemployment 
fluctuations. 
In this paper, we present a different approach in which monopolistic competition 
among active firms can enhance significant labor market volatility. The key ele­
ment that heJps us to get more volatility in labor market variables is procyelical 
entry of firms that produces countercyclical markups. The model developed in 
this paper is based on the works by Ebell et Haefke (2009) and Delacroix (2006), 
yet it differs in the following characteristics. The focus is on the cyelical behavior 
of the labor market variables while these two papers study the effect of policies 
on the steady-state labor market outcomes. Specifically, the first paper studies 
how the Carter-Reagan dereguJation in the early 1q~Os affpct the US labor ma.r­
ket and shows that barriers preventing a new firm from entering the market lead 
to a long-l'un deeline in industry size equilibrium, and thus a decline in the de­
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gree of competition. In the long l'un, the effect on unemployment equilibrium 
is 'modest and the real wage significantly decreases. The second paper applies 
the Ebell-Haefke framework but especially focuses on the impact of monopolistic 
competition on unionized sectors and on non-unionized sectors. As such the au­
thor studies the interactions between unions and unemployment insurance, and 
his results are consistent with the unemployment benefit in Europe, which are 
more generous when compared to those in the US, yet also characterized by more 
extensive unionization and lower payroll taxes. Our work was designed for a dif­
ferent purpose: that of solving the unemployment volatility puzzle. Moreover, 
while the two original papers only focus on the effects that policies have on the 
steady-state outcome of the labor market, our study allows aggregate shocks to be 
stochastic. The model is augmented in a dynamic form to allow for the aggregate 
productivity shocks that follow a stochastic process. 
The mechanism through which monopolistic competition helps to increase labor 
market volatility reveals that firms having monopoly power charge a price that 
is higher than their marginal cost by an amount equal to the markups. These 
latter are a decreasing function of the endogenous number of competing firms in 
the goods sector. In other words, a procyclical numbcr of active firms is associ­
ated with countercyclical markups. Thus, following a positive productivity shock, 
vacancies increase and unemployment falls not just because of the entry of new 
firms, but also because existing firms l'est rict their output less and hire more since 
they are now face competition from more firm. 
Sorne studies found in the literature that generate higher labor market volatility 
have been subject to criticism regard model parametrization such as the value 
of unemployment benefits employed by Hagedorn et j'vIanovskii (2008) in order 
to attain small firm surplus. This value, including leisure utility, amounts up to 
95% of pel' capita output. Thus, not just only it seems to be implausibly high 
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but also it causes, according to Costain et Reiter (2007), unemployment responds 
unrealistically high to even a small productivity shock. In our framework however, 
we try to calibrate the model parameters to match the available data. One of the 
key parameters in our model, the worker bargaining power, is set to be low to pin 
down the wage share. In the literature, model generated wage share is usually 
high and close to output due to the worker bargaining power is set to satisfy the 
Hosios efficient condition. 
Through assigning a plausible set of parameters, we find that the model reache? 
nearly 50% of volatility in the labor market key variables found in the data. 
Evaluating the model in other dimensions such as the cyclicality of entry and 
markups also demonstrates that the model performs quite weIl. 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 1.2 briefly discuss the related literature. 
Section 1.3 describes the model and present the analytical results. Numerical 
exercises are performed in Section 1.4 and finally, Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 Related literature 
There has been numerous studies attempting to solve the unemployment volatil­
ity puzzle and a great deal of progress has been made. Shimer (2005a) initiates 
the debate by simulating a version of this model, findiIlg that unemployment and 
vacancies are as volatile as labor productivity, even though the aggregate data 
reveals that they are mllrh more volatile - by a factor of 20. He points out that 
the Nash bargaining solution used ta determine wage is responsible for this. In 
the model, wage is negotiated according to the rule for surplus sharing, whereby 
an increase in labor proJucLiviLy will increase wage by the same proportion. As 
such, firms' profits will remain unchanged over the business cycle, meaning they 
have little incentive to create jobs and thus the model exhibits a moderate level 
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of labor market volatility. Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005) share the idea that to 
improve volatility in the labor market a sticky wage model is needed. Shimer in 
fact examines a constant wage model while Hall proposes a fixed bargaining wage 
set, and both conclude that a sticky wage model may result in substantial volat­
ility In the real world however a constant wage is implausible, yet the source of 
the bargaining set is still an unanswered question. They thus suggest that future 
research should focus on building a rigid wage model, and that a richer model 
would feature either wages affect worker turnover rates or asymmetric informa­
tion formats. Certain studies attempt to endogenize wage rigidity by applying 
asymmetric information 1.0 match-specifie productivity, and two of them, namely 
Guerrieri (2007) and Brügemann et Moscarini (2008), find tiny fluctuations in 
labor market variables. Guerrieri (2007) investigates a competitive search model 
(wage posting and not negotiating) both under full and private information in 
which she finds tiny fluctuations in labor market variables. The reason why she 
finds asymmetric information could dampen job creation in response to change in 
productivity is because of the firm's incentive to reveal worker's plivate effort by 
paying additional rents. fdore specifically, if a good shock hits a match relation­
ship, firm's surplus increases but the rents that need to be paid to the workers 
become higher and thus overall, firm's profit may increase but not significantly 
for more job creation. In the similar framework, Brügemann et Moscarini (2008) 
prove that asymmetric information can only generate rent rigidity but not wage 
rigidity, yielding insufficient unemployment volatility. 
The small match surplus approach was proposed by Hagedorn et Manovskii (2008), 
whereby the solution would be to have a high unemployment income representing 
95% of per capita output. This strategy typically induces small profits left for firms 
and guarantees that their net payoff would be more responsive to small changes 
in productivity, thus.reslllting in higher job creation rates. The Hagedorn et 
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Manovskii (2008) calibration has been however subject to a great deal of criticism 
because, as demonstrated by Costain et Reiter (2007), significant increases in 
aggregate productivity would cause unrealistic fluctuations in unemployment rate. 
Moreover, obtaining adequate measures of non-market value is a difficult task in 
itself. 
Other works attempt to make profit size small, such as that by Mortensen et 
Nagypal (2007) for example who include turnover costs, or Elsby et 't\/Iichaels 
(2008), who introduce downward-sloped labor demand. Compared to the models 
in these papers, the one we developed has sorne specifie and important distin­
guishing features. First, both papers only analyze the steady-state comparative 
statics. Although obtaining similar steady-state analysis is possible, the dynamic 
behavior might be quite different. Obviously including turnover costs (the costs 
of training and hiring \vorkers) would be another way of guaranteeing small profit 
size. Silva et Toledo (2008) who report evidence on turnover costs and simulate 
the Mortensen-Nagypal model, and thus are able to attain up to one fourth of 
the volatility observed in labor market tightness. Downward-sloped labor demand 
means that output is a concave function of labor input, yet when firms demand 
more labor, the marginal return of labor decreases, resulting in a small marginal 
surplus for a match. Elsby et Michaels (2008) reach one third of the cyclical 
variation in labor market tightness. 1 
J Elsby et Michaels (2008) in fact obtains the full cvclical variation in the job finding 
ritte hut. this litt.ter is it direct. function of the tightness generated from the matching fllnction, 
resulting in virtllally the same cyclical variation in both variables. The elasticity of tightness 
with respect to labor productivity as calculated using Shimer (2005)'s summary statistics is three 
times greater than that found by Elsby et Michaels (2008). That explains our data translation. 
11 
1.3 Madel 
To obtain analytical results and to gain sorne intuitions, we first consider the case 
of deterministic aggregate productivity and then later the dynamic stochastic case. 
We apply Delacroix (2006)'8 formulation, which is somewhat c1ifferent from Ebe11 
et Haefke (2009), and a110ws us to develop a simpler moclel representation and 
save calculation steps witl10ut causing any changes to the model's outcome. 
1.3.1 Basic environment 
In the economy there are two markets: goods and labor. The former is character­
ized by a monopolistic competition according to Dixit-Stiglitz and the latter by 
a standard matching modcl (e.g. Pissarides (2000)). Monopolistic firms enter an 
industry by paying an entry cost and once this has taken place, they take house­
holds' c1emand for goods as given and choose the number of vacancies needed to 
maximize the discounted value of future profits. Households sell their units of 
labor supply to the labor market and buy goods from the goods market. A frac­
tion of workers are unemployed and searching for a job while the rest are employed 
and face a certain probability of losing their jobs. AlI agents in the economy are 
risk neutral and discount their future payoffs at the rate r. 
1.3.2 The goods market 
There are H households in the economy and each is indexed by the subscript h 
and has a Dixit-Stiglitz preference for g differentiated goods. The economy is 
composed of g sectors and each specializes in a typical good i. Let C,1l be the 
quantity of goods i consl1med by household h not surpassing its real income h. 
Let Pi and P be the priee of goods i and the price index for a11 goods respectively. 
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The household h's utility maximization problem can be described as fol!ows 
9 1 (J-l ) a~l 
rgax ( :Lal CiT ' 
',h i=1 
subjeet ta the budget constraint 
ln the utility function for household h, 0" represents the elasticity of substitution 
across consumption goods and ai the weight assigned to goods i. ln the symmetric 
equilibrium al! goods are identical and thus ai = 1/9. The aggregate demand for 
goods i is obtained by solving the aforesaid problem 
yD = ~ (Pi)-(J 1 (1.1 ) 
t 9 P , 
where 1 = L:~=l h is the aggregate reaJ income, and the composite priee index P 
1 
is defined by P = ("'9 .!p1-(J) l-a . 
6t=J 9 t 
Suppose that al! firms in one sector play the Cournot game, i.e, a firm takes other 
firms' output in its sector as given. Let Ni be the number of firms competing in 
sector i. The demand function for a particular firm, indexed by j, in this sector 
is therefore 
_ 1 
Pi = [ Yi,j + (Ni - 1)Y1 ,_j]-U (1.2) P 9 J ' 
where Yi,j is the output of firm j and Yi,-J the average output for ail Nt - 1 other 
firms. ln symmetric equilibrium, al! firms are identical so that Yi,j = Yi,-J and the 
subscript j be dropped giving the elasticity of demand faced by a firm in sector i 
as 
Ei =O"Ni · (1.3) 
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The elasticity of demand is the product of the elasticity of substitution across 
goods and the number of competing firms. Increase either a or Ni will lead to 
an increase in the monopoly power Ei. The former characterizes the degree of 
competition among sectors while the latter the degree of competition vvithin each 
sector. In the literature hov"ever a is often treated as a preference parameter, and 
thus throughout this paper the possibility of it becoming a measure of competition 
would be ruled out, thus the degree of competition is determined by Ni. As the 
number of firms specializing in a good increases, then the greater number of 
households able to choose to buy this good from different firms. 
1.3.3 The labor market 
Matching frictions 
First, it is assumed that due to specialized skills households can only work in one 
sector. Frictions in the labor market however do not allow instantaneous meetings 
between firms and workers so that firms have to use its resources to find workers in 
the labor market. There are numerous sources of friction, as for example Pissarides 
(2000) tells us lack of coordination, asymmetric information, and heterogeneity 
of vacancies and workers, and aIl these factors can make matching costly. If a 
sector comprises a number of unemployed workers Ui and a numbel' of vacancy 
positions Vi, then the number of hirings, denote by m, is a combination of these 
two variables. The matching technology is defined by a Cobb-Douglas function, 
as is the production function, which combines labor and capital input to produce 
output 
where p., measures the matching efficiency and Tl the unemployment elasticity with 
respect to match. The matching function is a reduced form representation of the 
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frictions. Notice that m is (i) increasing and strictly concave in each separate 
argument, and (ii) constant returns to sCciJe (CRS) in both arguments. As sllch, 
there are likely more matches when more workers and firms are searching, yet 
when holding an input constant, matching results in diminishing marginal returns. 
Let define labor market tightness as the ratio of vacancie::; to unemployment, 
ei = VdUi. It is convenient to define ei, as will be seen in the equilibrium, all 
model variables will depend only on it. Given the Cobb-Douglas form of the 
matching function, workers find new jobs at rate f(ei) = m(~~,v;) = j.Leil - TI while 
a vacancy is filled at rate q(ei) = m(::,vi) = j.Le:TI . When labor market tightness 
increases - either vacancy increases or unemployment decreases - it is easier for 
workers to find jobs but more difficult for firms to find workers. 
A match between firm and worker can be broken either due to an unproductive 
match pair or a "death shock", which induces a firm to exit the industry sector. 
This model only considers the exogenous separation case. If for one period of 
time the firm's survival probability is oe, and the probability of a unproductive 
match pair is Os, then the average separation rate is 0 = oe + (1 - oe)os' Let Li 
be the current employment level in sector i, then Li accumulates according to the 
following equation 
(1.4) 
where the "prime" superscript indicates the next period. Eq. (1.4) states that 
next-period employment level is the sum of two ftows: those who have just been 
hired and those who stay in the previous employment pool, except that one part 
of them moves out of that pool. 
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Steady-state value functions 
Since the worker 's optimization problem is found only in the goods market (the 
demand function for goods (1.1)), defining her value function is straightforward. 
The firm's optimization problem is however a bit more complicated as it will be 
based on the employment dynamic (1.4), and thus the problem will be written in 
dynamic form before being simplifying into a steady-state form. Let U and W be 
the values of being unemployed and employed respectively. In ftow terms, they 
satisfy the following equations 
rU = b+ f(ei)[W - U], (1.5 ) 
rW = Wi+<5[U - W]. (1.6) 
Eq. (1.5) states that a unemployed worker recelves a ftow income b which is 
common across sectors. At the rate f(ei ), she meets an employment opportunity 
and, if taken, realizes a capital gain W - U. Likewise in Eq. (1.6), an employed 
worker in her sector is paid a wage Wi, and might lose the job at an exogenous 
probability <5 associated with a utility loss U - W. 
The value function for a firm is not habitually applied since as opposed to the 
îvIP model this model allows for multiple workers in each firm. Suppose for in­
stance that a firm has already paid the entry costs for business entry. After this 
procedure, the firm must decide to post a certain number of vacancy positions Vi 
atthe real unit cost '" in order to attract new workers for the next period. If any 
of these positions is filled then production starts with the technology given by 
(1. 7) 
where y represents labor productivity. Without changing the model implications, 
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capital is excluded from the firm production function. Including capital can ob­
viously help the model to gain more amplification because capital accumulation 
would expand output which in turn require the firm to hire more labor. 
Let V(L;) be the firm's value function which depends on the current level of 
employment as this latter is a state variable. \Ve follow Ebell et Haefke (2009) 
and Delacroix (2006) to assume that wage should be a function of L.;, given that 
its determination is based on the marginal surplus of each worker, the so-called 
intra-firm bargaining (IFB hereafter). IFB was first introduced by Stole et Zwiebel 
(1996) and further developed in a matching model context by Cahuc et Wasmer 
(2001) or Cahuc (lVIarque et \;\Tasmer) to refiect the overhiring incentive in large 
firms, whereby they hire more labor to weaken the bargaining position of existing 
workers and therefore their salaries. In other words, by adjusting the size, firms 
can manipulate wages so as to vary the marginal revenue in case of imperfect 
compëtition or the marginal product in case' of decreasing return. Therefore, 
each worker's pay is reduced, resulting in firms having an incentive to overhire. 
The IFB thus helps Ebell et Haefke (2009) in identifying significant decreases in 
real wage when competition increases and Delacroix (2006) in finding overhiring 
incentive in non-unionized sectors as compared to unionized sectors. 
Given the IFB assumption, the firm's optimization can be written as follows: 
V(L) = max _1_ {Pi Y: - w(l)L - K:.V + (1 - 6'e!,)V(L' )} (1.8)! 1 1 + _ p' CI,,!
Vi,L; 1 
subject to 
the demand function (1. 2) , 
the employment dynamic (1.4.), 
the production function (1. 7). 
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The first-order condition with respect to vacancy is 
K, ( _ )3V(L~) 
e (1.9) q( Bi) = 1 - 6 3L~ , 
which means that the total cost of posting a vacant position equals the expected 
value of filling it 2 Eq. 1.9 is the so-called job creation condition. Appendix A.1 
shows that the steady-state version of job creation condition is equivalent to the 
following typical monopolistic priee 
(1.10 ) 
Eq. (1.10) provides a weil known proposition: monopolistic firms charge a priee 
that is higher than their marginal cost by an amount equal to the markups. Here 
the marginal cost comprises two parts: the vacancy costs and the marginal costs 
of hiring additional workers. The term IJf!:'-l refiects the markup overs the total 
marginal cost. As will be shown in the equilibrium section, in the context of solving 
the unemployment volatility puzzle, Eq. (1.10) represents the key equation. 
Wage bargaining 
\i'lhen a firm and a worker sit clown to bargain over a wage paid, both parties make 
alternative offers until the agreement is concluclecl. The Nash procluct, which is 
basecl on the principle of sharing the wtal match surplus, is the solution to this 
type of negotiation game. With ,8 being equal to the worker's bargaining power, 
wage is the outcome of the following optimization problem 
fJmax [W - U]3 [3V(Li )/3L.d 1- 1 
w(L,) 
2Given q(ei ) is the Poisson arriva! rate of a new match for a firm, 1/q(e,) is thus the 
average duration of a vacant position. 
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The first component in the maximization problem stands for the worker's surplus 
while the second the firm's marginal surplus of an additional worker. The usual 
F.O.C. delivers a standard differential equation for real wage as given by 
(1.11) 
which is quite intuitive. Real wage is the weighted average of the marginal benefit 
of adding a worker and her outside option. Coing one step further, Appendix A.2 
gives an explicit solution for real wage, as a function of labor market tightness 
(1.12) 
Beveridge curve 
Traditionally, the Beveridge curve describes the link between unemployment level 
and vacancy level in the steady state. If the flow out of unemployment 1(8,) 
remains constant for a sufficiently long period and given the constant separation 
rate for ail sectors then the sectorial unemployment rate converges to the steady­
state rate 
(1.13) 
This is called the Beveridge curve in the v - 'U space. Through normalizing the 
economy's total labor force to 1, for each sector the labor force becomes 1/9 
for reasons of symmetry. The scctoria! 1 Iplv meut level is thus the product of 
firm-level employment and the nurnber of firms competing in the sector 
(1.14) 
Eq. (1.14) is another presentation of the traditional Beveridge cmye. 
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1.3.4 Equilibrium 
The model is now ready to be closed. Let define a short-run general equilibrium 
and a long-l'un general equilibrium separately. The former is characterized by 
taking the degree of competition as given while the later by endogenizing the 
number of competing firms. 
Short-run general equilibrium 
Definition 1 A short-Tun general equilibrium (BRGE) consists of a set of three 
endogenous variables {ei ,W (Li), pdP}, Jor a given number of firms specializing in 
one good Ni) that satisfy the following system of equations: 
1. the monopolistic priee (1.10) 
2. the wage equation (1.12) 
3. the aggregate resouree constraint 
(1.15) 
For reasons of symmetry, i.e., aU goods are identical, the relative price is equal to 
unity so that 1= gNiYi and the aggregate demand function (1.1) is equaJ to the 
aggregate income and to the aggregate production. Expanding the SRGE system 
of equations makes it possible to obtain one equation, linking labor productivity 
y to labor market tightness ei 
y = aN; - f3 [b + r+ 6+ (3f(e i ) _"'_] (1.16)
aNi-l (1-f3)(1-6e )q(ei)' 
Eq. (1.16) is a modified version of the job creation equation because it was directly 
derived from the firm's optimization problem. The existence and the uniqueness 
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Figure 1.1 Short-run equilibrium and the effect of a positive aggregate shock 
of the short-run general equilibrium (SRGE) are ensured under the condition that 
y > ~~:=~ b which means output per vvorker is higher than the non-market vahe 
corrected for the markups. This is so because the right hand side of (1.16) is 
strictly increasing in ei while its left hand side is a constant. The inequality is a 
necessarily condition to ensure that the constant line and the curve (the increasing 
function of ei) meet. 
The SRGE is presented in Figure 1.1 where market tightness eis a strictly increas­
ing function of N. It is obvious from Eq. (1.16) that an increase in the degree of 
competition will further amplify the cyclical variation in e. 
Consider now the cyclical behavior of the labor market tightness ei following a 
positive prociuctivity shock. The cconomy is initiall:y at the equilibri~urn IJUiIlL El-
If the labor productivity increases from y to a higher level yi then the equilibrium 
moves from El to E~ followed by an increase in the labor market tightness. If the 
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clegree of competition however increases from N1 to N2 for a particular reason such 
as high inclustry profits, then the equilibrium will move towarcl point E;, leading 
further increase in Bi' The intuition behind this is that in the short run, an increase 
in labor productivity increase output demand. Then, given that the priee of goocls 
8.nd the markups remain unchanged, firms must hire more workers to meet the 
increased demand for goods. Overtime, higher industry profits attraet more firms 
to enter the business and thus inerease the degree of competition, leaving a smaller 
markups and alternatively, a further increase in job creation. 
Long-run general equilibrium 
The long-run general equilibrium (LRGE) is clefined such that it allows N.i to be 
endogenized. In the short run, monopolistic competitors may either earn positive 
profits and attract new entrants, or operate at a loss, resulting in an industry 
shakeout. More particularly, the number of firms entering into business will have 
to respect the free entry condition, i. e., entry is allowed onee the expected industry 
profits are driven to zero. The eut-off point, i.e., the maximum number of firms 
allowed to enter, is determined by equalizing the expected net present value of 
average profits from engaging in business and the costs of establishing a standard 
firm. In doing so, firms must take into account the exogenous probability of exiting 
from their sector 6e . As such, the free entry condition is clefinecl as 
where Ci is the entry costs which is taken as fixed costs because data may provide 
this kind of information. The term Ki = 15 Yi - 'WiLi - "'Vi is thus the current 
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profit. After sorne algebra, the free entry condition is given by 
(1.17) 
Eq. (1.17) along with Eq. (1.10) determine the endogenous degree of competition 
and characterize the long-run equilibrium defined below: 
Definition 2 A long-run general equilzbrium (LRGE)consists of a set of four 
endogenous variables {(Ji, Wi, pdP, Nd that satisfy the following system of equa­
tions: 
1. the monopolistic priee (J. 10), 
2. the wage equation (1.12), 
3. the aggregq,te resouree con$tmint (J.15), 
4. the free entry condition (1.17). 
Similar to SRGE case, one would need a condition to ensure the the existence and 
the uniqueness of the LRGE, which is y > b. Given Wi in (1.12), the long-run 
equilibrium system can be reduced to two equations with two unknowns ((Ji, Ni)' 
The first equation is the job creation (1.16) which gives a positive relation between 
Bi and Ni' The second equation is the free entry condition (1.17) which clearly 
shows a negative relation between Bi and Ni· The condition for the t"vo curves 
eut at a point is ùbta.ineo b. tCl.king the limit of both curves when Ni ~ 00 and 
imposing the limit of the first equation higher than the second's one. 
Consider the long-run equilibrium system in the (Ji - Ni spa-œ shown in Figure 1.2. 
A positive aggregate shock will increase the labor market tightness (Ji more in the 
long run than in the short run This is because when N increases, the creation 
--
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Figure 1.2 Long-l'un equilibrium and the effect of a positive aggregate shock 
job curves diverge so that the variation in 8i in the long run is higher than in the 
short l'un. 
1.3.5 Dynamic verSIOn 
To rewrite the model in a dynamic version and in continuous time, we follow the 
method used by Shimer (2üüSa). Suppose now that y is subject to aggregate 
shocks arriving at a Poisson probability À which then change y to a new level yi. 
This new productivity is drawn from a first-order Markov process in continuous 
time. Let EyXyl be the expected value of an arbitrary variable X, following the 
next aggregate shock, and conditional on the current state y. For simplification, 
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the superscript will be omitted. 
Now, given the state of the economy as it changes into a new one with probability 
À, ail value functions should be subject to this feature. The goods market however 
is unaffected by the latter because households' decision is a one-period optimiz­
ation problem. The value functions for two types of workers are now changed 
to 
TUy b+ f(ey)[Wy - Uy]+ À[EyUy' - uy],
 
TWy wy(L) + o[Uy - Wy]+ À[EyWy' - Wy].
 
For a firm, its value function satisfies 
subject to (1.2), (1.4) and (1.7). Denoted by Sy = ô~iL) + Wy - Uy be the total 
surplus of a wor~er-firm Illatch pair, Appendix A.3 shows that it must satisfy 
(1.18) 
Therefore, the steady-state first-order condition with respect to vacancy is now 
given by 
(1.19) 
Rearranging (1.18) to yield 
(1.20) 
which is somewhat similar to the job creation equation (1.16), yet it now includes 
a new term resulted From the aggregate shocks. \Vith a y vector and given N 
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is defined by the free entry condition (1.17), the system of equations (1.19) and 
(1. 20) can be solved recursively to obtain a evector and a S vector. The dynamic 
version then appears to be new to the original paper by Ebell et Haefke (2009). 
1.4 N umerical analysis 
In this section, we first calibrate the model parameters in the static form and. 
In what followi:i, we simulate the model dynamic version and report the summary 
statistics as in Shimer (2005). We will only solve for the LRGE because the SRGE 
requires setting a fixed number of competing firms. The LRGE in particular is a 
more interesting case due to the endogenous degree of competition involved and 
when used to study business cycle facts, the mechanism results in more amplific­
ation. 
1.4.1 Calibration strategy 
The model's parameters are calibrated on a quarterly basis. For a summary of 
how they are computed, see Table 1.1. The deterministic aggregate productivity 
y = 1 is taken for normalization. The standard quarterly interest rate selected 
is T = 0.012, providing a consistent annual D.S. real interest rate of around 5%. 
The elasticity of substitution across goods a = 5 is taken in the range estimated 
by a number of authors3 The number of sectors 9 = 13 targets the estimates of 
markups in gross output that is about 1.15. 
The most critical parameter is unemployment income b. As Hagedorn et Man­
ovskii (2008) show labor market volatility depends mostly on this parameter yet 
the value they chose, b = 0.95, is spectacularly implausible. Various values of 
3 Christiano et al. (2001) and Rotemberg and \Voodford (1995). 
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Table 1.1 Quarterly parameters 
Parameter ~/Ieaning Source/Target 
T = 0.012 interest rate data 
0"=5 elasticity of substitution Chistiano et a1. (2001) 
9 = 13 number of sectors markups 
P = 0.07 entry costs Djankov P.t al (2002) 
f.L = 2.1 matching scale job finding prob.
 
17 = 0.5 m elasticity w.r.t. U Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
 
(3 = 0.022 workers' bargaining power wage share
 
b = 0.6 unemployment income OECD Unemployment Benefit & ... database 
0=0.11 separation rate employment duration 
oe = 0.03 firm's survival prob. median job tenure 
K, = 3.88 vacancy cost mean tightness 
rJ'N-(3 = 1.15 markups Data
rJ'N-l 
f.Le1-ry = 1.78 job finding prob. Shimer (2005b)
 
4/0 = 2.24 years employment duration Shimer .(2005b)
 
Log(60%) = 4 2
 median job tenure Scarpetta et al. (2002)4Log(1-oe) . 
e= 0.72 mean tightness JOLTS data 
b have been used as for example: Shimer (2005a) sets b = 0.4, Hall (2005) and 
Mortensen et Nagypal (2007) 0.73, Elsby et Michaels (2008) 0.622, and Silva et 
Toledo (2008) 0.677. In the present model, we choose b = 0.6 as in Delacroix 
(2006) who refers to the OECD Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and Re­
placement Rates database (1997) as a database to evaluate unemployment income. 
According to the latter, 30% of the average output is devoted to unemployment 
insurance replacement rate and home production a180 accounts for 30% of average 
output. Adding these two sources yields a unemployment incarne of 0.6 which 
falls below the average of the range used by the literature. 
To calibrate the parameters in the matching function, we refer to the monthly 
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unemployment-to-employment fiow estimated by Shimer (2005b), 0.594, as the job 
finding rate f(e) = J.Le l- 1J • The average quarterly unemployment-to-employment 
fiow should be approximately equal to the probability times the length of time, 
which is 3 x 0.594 = 1.78. We take the elasticity of unemployment with respect 
to match estimated by Petrongolo et Pissarides (2001), 17 = 0.5, for the match­
ing function. We follow Pissarides (2009) to pindown mean market tightness in 
1960-2006, which was 0.72, obtained from Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey (JOLTS) data since December 2000 and the Help-Wanted Index (HWI) 
adjusted to the JOLTS units of measurement before then. This implied the match­
ing efficiency parameter J.L = f(e)je1-'fJ = 2.1. 
We choose the average quarterly separation rate !5 = 0.11 to target the US struc­
turaI unemployment rate of 59%. According to the 1997 OECD report on Dis­
tribution of employment by employer tenure, the median job tenure is 4.2 years. 
In Scarpetta et al. (2002), estimation of firms survivor rates at different lifetimes, 
the survival probability of a 4.2-year firm is 60%. Given that, the probability for a 
firm to exit itse!f each quarter is de = 1- 0.61/(4X42) = 0.03. Thus, the probability 
of a unproductive match pair is ds = (<5 - <5e)/(l- <5e ) = 0.082. 
We follow the study done by Djankov et al. (2002) to take a fraction p of the annual 
pel' capita GDP devoting to entry costs. On a quarterly basis, the fraction should 
approximately be p = 7%. This entry costs including start-up and administration 
costs appear to be realistically low sinee entry requires sunk investments. For this 
reason, we also include in the eJltry costs an amount equal to the initial hi ring 
costs or the total costs of finding just L employees neeoed ta start the production 
process. Since ail the population is available to work, the pel' capita GDP is then 
equal to the aggregate output divided by the labor force, y(l - u). Hence 
Ci = py(l - u) + roue, (1.21) 
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where eis the mean tightness. 
The literature on matching models often imposes (3 = 1] ta satisfy the Hosios' 
efficient condition (Hosios (1990)). In this model, (3 = 0.022 is chosen ta target 
the wage share (2/3) observed in the aggregate data level. Notice that within the 
current debate, a fairly low value Df (3 may not be very convincing, but it is quite 
consistent ,vith the range [0.01;0.08] estimated by Blanchfower (Oswald et Sanfey) 
and Hildreth et Oswald (1997). Other study also finds low ,8 as for example 
Delacroix (2006) who finds (3 = 0.045 ta represent the 7% of the relative difference 
between union and non-union wages. The work by Hagedorn et Manovskii (2008) 
sets (3 = 0.052 in arder ta target the clasticity of real wage with respect ta labor 
productivity of 0.5. Finally, in arder ta target the average tightness e= 0.72 we 
need ta set /'\, = 3.88. 
1.4.2 Simulation results 
Consider the stochastic process of the aggregate shock described in Appendix A.4 
which delivers the simulation results in the last row of Table 1.2. Ta see how well 
the model performs in terms of labor market volatility, we compare it ta the data 
and the literature discussed in Section 1.2. We can also evaluate the model in sorne 
additional dimensions. For example, implications for the markup and firm entry 
could be compared ta the business cycle literature. Shimer (2005) 's summary 
statistics of quarterly D.S. data and his simulation results of the MP model are 
reported in the first and the second row. It becomes clear that the standard model 
fails ta obtain the labor market volatility seen in the data.. In the third row of 
tbis table, WP. incll1np. t.hp. results of H8.gedorn et Manovskii (2008) who simubtc 
the standard model with high unemployment incarne (b=0.95) and this strategy 
explains ail or even more volatility in the data since ~~~:i~~ = ~:~i; = 22.46 > 
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Table 1.2 Volatilityand cyclical behavior of labor market variables 
Std.(u) Std.(v) Std.(8) Std.(y)a Elas.(8jy) Elas.(wjy) Wage Entry El1 
share rate (markt 
Data 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.02 7.56 0.5-1 b 0.67 0.62%C [-0.16,-
Shimer 0.009 0.027 0.035 0.02 1.75 1 0.98 
HM 0.145 0.169 0.292 0.013 21.72 0.5 0.97 
j\JIodel 0.07 0.097 0.159 0.02 5.99 0.6 0.67 0.93% -o. 
aTargeted. 
bPissarides (2009) 
CAnnual Survey of Manufact1ll'ers panel data From Campbell (1998), Table 1. 
dMartins et al. (1996), T'able 6. 
19.10 = 0(/0822 and the elasticity of tightness with respect to shock is, as Costain 
et Reiter (2007) pointed out, unrealistically high (21.72 vs. 7.56). Hagedorn 
et Manovskii (2008) use the standard smoothing parameter for quarterly data 
(1600) which is much less smooth than the one used by Shimer (2005a) (105 ) so 
that why they obtain lower standard deviation but the relative standard deviation 
is unchanged. Note, however, that both Shimer and HM generated wage share 
is relatively very high as compared to the data. HM calibration targeted the 
cyc1icality of real wage based on aggregate data level and Shimer generates a 
proportional wage elasbcity while Pissarides (2009) inspects microdata level on 
wage and finds that wage is strongly procyc1ical. The latter argues that since 
wage derived from the Nash bargaining rule represents the negotiation between 
an individual and a firm so that it should reflect the individual or microdata 
level. Our parametrization yields a somewhat low elasticity of real wage due to 
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the relatively low wage share. But only wage rigidity, as shown by Hagedorn et 
Manovskii (2008), is not enough to amplify volatility and it is the unemployment 
benefits the key parameter. In the fourth row, our simulation results indicate that 
monopolistic competition under plausible calibration can generate up to 50% of 
the the labor market volatility, which is a substantial improvement. For the entry 
rate measured as the net change en percentage of the number of entering firms, 
the eighth column of the table shows that our model generates a rate higher than 
the data level provided by Campbell (1998). This might be due to the fact that 
the data used to calculate the entry rate is the Annual Survey of Manufacturers 
where manufacture firm size is generally large and different across firms while in 
our model, ail firms are identical. Yet another reason is that our low value of 13 
allows firm to extract almost the match surplus which in turn implies higher entry 
rate in responding to aggregate shocks. The last column shows the countercydical 
markups which are in the range estimated by Ma.rtins (Scapetta et Pilat) who use 
U.S. panel firms data for different industries. 
Table 13 shows the simulation results for the persistency of and the link between 
labor market variables as shown in Shimer (2005). In terms of quarteriy autocor­
relation and with the exception of unemployment and tightness, model vacancy 
does not fit the data weil. The correlation between unemployment and vacancy ­
the Beveridge curve very close to the data (-0.871 vs. -0.894), yet the correlation 
between unemployment and and labor productivity is far from the data (-0.864 vs. 
-0.408). This result, although it remains unexplained, still represents a significant 
improvement for the model. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Our low value of worker bargaining power might be subject to criticism because 
the literature often imposes a value 13 = f) = 0.5 to satisfy the efficient condition. 
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Table 1.3 Autocorrelation and correlation matrix 
u v e y 
Data: 1951I-2003IV 
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.878 
u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.408 
Correlation matrix v 1 0.975 0.364 
e 1 0.396 
1Y 
Shimer 
Autocorrelation 0.939 0.835 0.878 0.878 
u 1 -0.927 -0.958 -0.958 
Correlation matrix v 1 0.996 0.995 
e 1 0.999 
1Y 
Hagedorn and Manov::ikii 
Autocorrelation 0.830 0.575 0.751 0.765 
u 1 -0.724 -0.916 -0.892 
Correlation matrix	 v 1 0.940 0.904 
e 1 0.967 
y 1 
)\/Iodel 
Autocorrelation 0.918 0.733 0.849 0.877 
u 1 -0.871 -0.954 -0.864 
Correlation matrix	 v 1 0.977 0.872 
e 1 0.893 
y 1 
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To see how sensitive the model results respond to changes in this parameters 
while respecting the calibration strategy as in the baseline case for targeting the 
markups of 1.15 and the mean tightness of 0.72 so that the two parameters 9 
and f\, change accordingly: for (3 equal to {0.5,0.3,0.1}, the pair (g,f\,) are set to 
{(45,0.32), (29,0.69), (18, 1.92)} respectively Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the volat­
ility and cyclical behavior of labor market variables and the autocorrelation and 
correlation matrix respectively. Overall when (3 varies, the volatility of unemploy­
ment, vacancy and tightness do not vary much while the elasticity and the entry 
rate and the markups respond strongly to productivity shocks. The correlation 
matrix is much improved for the case (3 = 0.5 as compared to the data in Table 
1.3, and neither Shimer (2005) nor Hagedorn et Manovskii (2008) could improve 
the correlation matrix results as labor market variables are strongly correlated 
with with y, 0.95 on average, while the correlation coefficients provided by the 
data are relatively small, 0.4. 
Table 1.4 Volatility and cyclical behavior of labor market variables: sensitivity 
analysis 
Std.(u) Std.(v) Std.(e) Std.(y)a Elas.(ejy) Elas.(wjy) Wage 
share 
Entry 
rate 
Elas. 
(markupsjy) 
(3 = 0.5 0.049 0.072 0.115 0.02 3.52 1.01 0.85 0.16% -0.024 
(3 = 0.3 0.05 0.073 0.117 0.02 3.68 1.00 0.84 0.25% -0.038 
(3 = 0.1 0.057 0.081 0.131 0.02 4.38 0.93 0.77 051% -0.077 
œrargeted. 
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Table 1.5 Autocorre1ation and correlation matrix: sensitivity ana1ysis 
u v e y 
fi = 0.5 
Autocorrelation 0.878 0.619 0.771 0.877 
u 1 -0.823 -0.932 -0.571 
Correlation matrix v 1 0.972 0.577 
e 1 0.589 
1Y 
(3 = 0.3 
Autocorrelation 0.884 0.637 0.783 0.877 
u 1 -0.831 -0.936 -0.621 
Correlation matrix 'U 1 0.973 0.628 
e 1 0.641 
1Y 
(3 = 0.1 
Au tocorrelation 0.901 0.687 0.817 0.878 
u 1 -0855 -0.946 -0.747 
Correlation matrix v 1 0.975 0.755 
e 1 0.771 
1Y 
1.5 Conclusion 
The unemployment volatility puzzle has attracted numerous works to develop an 
effective mechanism for the standard sea.rch and matching model in order to un­
derstand why key 1abor market variables such as unemployment and vacancy have 
responded widely to change in aggregate shocks. As argued by Shimer (2005a), 
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the Nash bargaining solution used to determine wage is responsible for this. In the 
model, wage is negotiated according to the rule for surplus sharing, whereby an 
increase in labor productivity will increase wage by the same proportion. As such, 
firms' profits will remain unchanged over the business cycle, meaning they have 
little incentive to create jobs and thus the model exhibits a moderate level of labor 
market volatility. Although sonie modifications of the model, for example Haged­
orn et Manovskii (2008), might bring the model' prediction close tü the data, 
the parameterization used has been subject to a great deal of criticism. This 
motivated this research to develop a simple matching model with monopolistic 
cornpeti tion. 
Our approach is relatively different to the literature, that of monopülistic com­
petition among active firms which can enhance significant labor market volatility 
under plausible parallleters. The key element that helps us to get more volatility 
in labor market variables is procyclical entry of firms that produces coulltercyclical 
markups. The sensitivity analysis has shown that even with the standard para­
meterization, the model provides a substantial improvement in the labor market 
volatility as compared to the standard search and matching model. The only 
problem that we are concerned is the low calibrated value of workers' bargaining 
power (3 = 0.022 in the baseline case, yet literature on matching models has never 
paid any attention to the wage share in the data which relatively 10weI than the 
one generated by the literature. A low wage share also produces weak procyclic­
a.lity of real wage as shown by our simulation results. The value of (3 (0.5) often 
used by the literature might however lead readers to ask the following qupstion: 
"Do workers really have the same power of negotiation as employers?". "Yes" 
may be a convincing answer if these workers are highly skilled workers (e.g. uni­
'/crsity profcssors, doctors, CEOs, etc) but if most of thêm are nuL LiJeu IJutting 
them in the same position as employers is qui te "uncomfortable". Unemployment 
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should be the key factor in determining workers' bargaining power, though it was 
not explicitly modeled. The majority of the labor force has experienced that the 
cost of being unemployed was both economically and psychologically large, ifs 
therefore reasonable to argue that workers' bargaining should be low. 
36
 
CHAPTER II
 
THE EFFECTS OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM OF
 
HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION ON LABOR MARKET
 
IN CHINA
 
We study the effects of the Chinese Hukou system of household re­
gistration (the law that limits migration the rural to the urban areas 
and vice-versa) on labor market outcomes. Vve develop a search equi­
librium model of migration in a worker heterogeneity context. vVe 
find that if the Hukou system of household registration is relaxed by 
either decreasing the law enforcement or allowing more people to live 
in the city, urban unemployment rate would be reduced, and more 
particularly the social welfare would be increased. 
Keywords: Hukou system, worker heterogeneity, developing coun­
tries 
2.1 Introduction 
In many countries, including the most developed, the existence of an informai 
(unregulated) sector has made it possible for many of the country's poor to survive. 
In developing countries, the informai sector represents a very important part of the 
economy, creating jobs not only for the poor and also those who have lost their jobs 
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and receive no financial assistance from the government. According to statistics 
on developing countries provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the proportion of the labor force participating in the informai sector may vary from 
30% to 70%. In China, the informai sector concept did not appear until the late 
1980s and 1990s, following several attempts made by the Chinese government to 
reform the labor market.Prior to these periods, China had a centralized economy 
governed by the Communist Party and most urban workers were lifetime employed 
in the state- and collectively-owned enterprises (Knight et Yueh (2004)). The 
most relevant labor ma.rket reforms resulted from government efforts to reduce 
surplus labor in the sta.te-owned enterprises (hereafter SOE) and the relaxation 
of the Hukou household registration system. According to Appleton et al. (2002), 
more than 25 million SOE workers were la.id-off between 1996 and 1999. At 
this same time restrictions on rural-urban migration linked to the hukou system 
were relaxed, leading to the massive numbers of people migration from rural to 
urban areas. The result was in increase in urban unemployment thus placing 
more pressure on the government to resolve many employment issues. Solutions 
a.c!opted and promoted included the creation of private enterprises and an increase 
in economic activities in the informai sector. Indeed, as they took on informai 
jobs, many workers were better off than before, especially in terms of income 
(ILO 2002 statistics). Recently, the OECD estimated China's unemployment and 
based on the 2000 population census found that those making Hp the informai 
sector were mainly i) rural migrant workers who because of the hukou registration 
system couId not work in registered enterprises; and ii) laid-off workers from state 
enterprises who took informai cmployment on a temjJurary basis while remaining 
nominally attached to their pl'evious work units in order to obtain welfare benefits 
and re-employment opportunities. 
In this paper, we focus essentially on the effects of the Hukou system of household 
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registration. The Hukou law restricts labor mobility between countryside and city, 
and between city and city. In fact, a person holding rural Hukou status cannot 
work in the urban areas and vice-versa. If a rural Hukou holder moves to the 
city or a urban Hukou holder moves to the countryside, both are considered as 
illegal migrants. As the Hukou system has been proved to be responsible in rising 
social inequality and discriminating against migrant workers, many prominent 
scholars have recommended the Chinese government to put the rule out of effect. 
Regarding whether or not the system should be abolished still remains a greatest 
challenge faced by the Chinese government, although many reforms have been 
made since 1980s and 1990s. 
There are few studies applying the standard search and matching model to de­
veloping countries context so we develop this model in a worker heterogeneity 
environment and quantify the effects of relaxing the Hukou system on the labor 
market outcomes. 'vVe find that if the Hukou system of household registration is 
relaxed by either decreasing the law enforcement or allowing more people to live 
in the city, urban unemployment rate would be reduced. Moreover, the social 
welfare defined by the sum of the utilities of the employed and the unemployed, 
the production of the firms net of search costs would increase. In the first case, 
i.e, keeping the number of Hukou status unchanged while lightening up the detec­
tion of the illegal workers in the urban sector, that would help the urban sector 
become more attractive to rural residents, so firms hiring both illegal and legal 
Hukou status "vould benefit more from illegal worker since the rent firms extract 
from illegal workers is higher than that from legal workers and this in turn would 
induce firms to create more vacant positions. In the face of quick economic and 
social change in China, it is likely that the Hukou system will not be maintained 
in the future and there is a greater likelihood that workers prefer to work in the 
urban sector where more job opportunities with higher income, as compared to 
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the rural sector. 
The model presented in this paper is built in the sprit of the Laing (Park et Wang) 
model (hereafter LPW model). The LPW is an extension of the classical Harris­
Todaro rural-urban migration model (Torado (1969) and Torado et Harris (1970)) 
to allow for job search in the urban areas. The classical Harris-Todaro model is 
a behavioral model of migration whereby rural workers decide to migrate to the 
urban areas based not only on wage differentials but also on the probability of 
finding a job at the prevailing wage, i.e., migration decision is based on expected­
income differentials, adjusting for migration costs. It turns out that in this kind 
of model there is a scenario in which ail rural workers will migrate to the urban 
areas whenever the net benefits from migration exceed the migration costs. In 
the LPW model, the view of migration is different from the classical models as 
it assumes that there should be no migration in equilibrium. In other words, not 
ail rural worlœrs will migrate to the urban areas, even though expected-income 
differences between two regions are present. Moreover, labor turnover becomes an 
additional source that contributes to deter migration in China, especially migrant 
workers often face higher risk of no-employment due to the presence of Hukou law. 
This reduces the fraction of illegal migrants and therefore urban unemployment 
rate. 
\iVorker heterogeneity in our model can be thought of as not ail workers would 
like to live in the countryside and not ail workers would be qualified for urban 
sector jobs. In other words, the least productive workers do not find profitable 
to move to the cities and stay in rural areas. Another feature that distinguishes 
our model from the LPW model is the way the law affects workers. In the LPW 
model, the law directly affects the supply side directly via the migration channel. 
In our contcxt, the law affects not only the supply side but also the demand side 
because of variation in the firm's match surplus ,,,hen it hires an illegal migrant. 
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The approach to worker heterogeneity in our moclel is adapted from the work done 
by Albrecht (Navarro et Vroman). These authors introduce worker heterogeneity 
to anaIyze the effects of severance payments and payroll taxes on informaI and 
formaI sector outputs, on the division of workforce into unemployment, informaI 
employment and forma.! employment, and on wages in four large Latin Amer­
iean economies: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and l\!lexico. It is an extension of 
the standard Mortensen et Pissarides (1994) model for an economy consisting of 
substantial activity in the informaI sector. According to them, high productivity 
workers transfer to forma] sector jobs while those in the lower one can only work 
in the informaI sector, wlth sorne in between working in both sectors. The ANV 
modei differs from the approach used in this paper in severa.! dimensions. First, 
the agriculture constitutes an additionai sector in the country's economy. Seconcl, 
there are no idiosyncratic shocks. Third, as in the LPW model, illegal workers 
in the urban sector suffer from faster break-clown rates resulting from the law. 
Finally, it has been claimed that employment protection legislation in developing 
countries is very "veak. This is true in China in particular. Most employed workers 
do not pay income taxes, such that in this model severance payments and payroll 
taxes are precluded elements. 
ApaTt from the papers by Laing (Park et Wang) and Albrecht (Navarro et Vro­
man), reiatively few studies apply the search equilibrium model within the de­
veloping country context. As a means of explaining the existence of a sizcable 
informaI sector in developing countries, Satchi et Temple (2006) develop a general 
equilibrium model focusing on the importance of matching friction in explaining 
the existence of a sizeable informaI sector in developing countries. As such they 
investigate how labor market institutions affect aggregate productivity and sec­
toral structures. Their modei allows rural workers to seek higher pay jobs in the 
formaI sector although they undergo search costs, and before beginning this pro­
42 
cess they have to enter the informai sector, meaning they incur migration costs. 
Zenou (2008) applies a method somewhat similar to that of Satchi and Temple 
(2006), but he focuses on the negative effects that unemployment benefits fin­
anced by taxes on firms' profits have on formai job creation and the size of the 
informai sector, and on the ambiguous cffects on wages. Bosch et Esteban-Pretel 
(2009) put the unemployment volatility puzzle - the standard search and matching 
model's failure to generate a significant magnitude of unemployment fluctuations 
over the business cycle - into the context of an economy having adequate activity 
in the informai sector, such as in Brazil. 
The fact that illegal workcrs in our model suffer from higher probability of loosing 
job is also closely related to the study done by Boeri et Garibaldi (2005). Theil' 
model comprises two sectors, shadow and legal, where those in the shadow sector 
are allowed to post vacant positions. The difference bet\.veen the two sectors is that 
employed workers in the legal sector pay taxes and unelilployed workers receive 
compensation, while in the shadow sector no transfers take place, but employed 
workers face law-enforcement monitoring. These authors show that there is a cut­
off skillievei that sorts workers into each sector, with the more productive workers 
relocating into the legal sector. Our model differs from theirs in that it allows 
the existence of a rural sector and analyses the direct effect of law-enforcement 
monitoring on the rural-urban migration flow. 
The approach we use to model the rural sector is similar to the work done by 
Gutierrz (Paci et Park). To accommodate the existence of the agriculture sector 
they exteno the ANV model and study the economic consequences of financial 
crises on Nicaragua's labor market. They find that economic shocks have only 
modest effects on employment but significant effects on worker rplnCCl.tio!'l across 
sectors. The model present in this paper is different in the sense that we focus on 
the presence of the Hukou law. 
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In the remainder of this pélper, Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the Hukou 
system and a recent debate on the economic effects of implementing the related 
law. In Section 2.3 a theoretical model is developed while Section 2.4 provides the 
numerical analysis undertaken to quantify the impact from labor market policy. 
Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 The Hukou system and its economlC literature 
This section provides a brief overview and a recent debate on the economic effects 
of implementing the law. For a detailed history and the evolution of the Hukou 
system, see Liu (2005), Zhao (2003) or Afridi (Xin Li et Ren). 
Right after the Chinese Cornmunist Party took power of the country In 1949, 
rural migrants flooded ioto the major cities to look for better job opportunities, 
causing numerous social problems. In response to this the Chinese government 
introduced the Hukou system two years later, but only in urban areas. The 
officially stated purpose was to maintain social peace and arder, safeguard the 
people's security, and protect their freedom of residence and movement. Under 
this system, only urban Hukou holders could access to social programs such as 
housing, social insurance, hea.lth care, etc., and as a result, the flood of rural 
migrant::; continued to expand, forcing the gOVf~rnment to circulate a. directive 
in 1955 and extend this law into rural areas. This directive was intended to 
prevent unplanned migration between rural and urban areas and between cities, 
and became received official sanction for any change of resiuence. At the time, 
almost ail urban jobs were allocated and controlled by the SOEs and through 
a supervisory office (the State Labor Bureau), authorized to assign employment 
to urban residents only. Rural or urban Hukou holders were considered illegal 
migrants if they workecl in a city in which they were not permanent residents. 
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Until 1998, children could not get into urban schools if their mothers held rural 
Hukou status, while rural residents could obtain urban Hukou status through 
two main channels: formai and informai (Xing (2009)). Those obtaining urban 
Hukou through formai channels consisted of workers being hired by the SOEs), 
joining the army, obtaining university degrees or performing in national sport 
teams. Informai channel included those whose lands had been occupied by urban 
construction projects and were buying houses in the urban areas. 
The Hukou system thus created a huge surplus of rural workers that could not 
be absorbed in the rural areas. Thus in 1983 the state allowed rural households 
to take up jobs in market towns, without changing their residence. In 1984, 
peasants were officially permitted to work or do business in cities and as such 
local governments "vere authorized to issue a temporary residential permit to those 
finding legitimate jobs in the city, and a blue-stamp Hukou (blue card) to investors, 
property buyers and professionals sponsored by major enterprises. Rolders of blue 
cards enjoyed more government benefits than those holding temporary residential 
permits. The blue cards in fact functioned more like regular Hukou, and within 2 
to 5 years there was a good chance of obtaining regular urban Hukou cards. As of 
1990, rural residents coulf! obtain urban Rukou status by paying a one-time entry 
fee varying from a few thousand yuan in small cities and towns to 50,000 yuan 
in major cities. Today, local governments still require sorne business firms to hire 
only local resic!ents but the level of enforcement has diminished somewhat. 
Studies on the economic and social impacts of Hukou system are numerous. This 
is especially t.rue among certain empirical works, most of which quantify the law's 
effects on the welfare of rural migrants and on wage inequality across rural and 
urban areas and within these regions. Using the 1997 Beijng l',1Iigrant Census, Guo 
et Iredale (2004) show that a university degree and a non-agricultural registration 
status could both lead to increased access to employment in the formai sector and 
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that qualified migrants were able to penetrate the formaI job market, even though 
most migrants are still restricted to low level jobs in the informaI sector. Liu (2005) 
uses a household data survey from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project 
to examine the impacts OIl social and economic of urban residents. He found 
for example that people who obtained urban Hukou later in their lives tended to 
benefit less from social protection such as government heath care benefits, pension 
and subsidies, had lower education levels and remained unemployed for longer 
periods of time. Afridi (Xin Li et Ren) conducted themselves an experimental 
study in which they investigated the impact of migrant status on individuals' 
responses to economic incentives. They found that making individuals' Hukou 
status salient and public Ivould decrease the performance levels of rural migrant 
children assigned certain tasks by 12%, resulting in lower income rankings for 
rural migrants and placing them at the 100ver end of income distributions. A recent 
study by Huang (2010) has shed new light on the causes of decreased consumption 
rates during the peiiod 1993-2007 while household average saving rates among 
Chinese consumers had not increased. This was explained by the lack of social 
benefits applied to rural migrant workers, who, compared with their urban Hukou 
counterparts, had stronger precautionary saving motivation. More particularly, 
children's education leve!s were found to be the most significant factors in their 
precautionary saving motivation. Rural migrants whose children and family live 
in a city are not able to send their children to local school systems but they can 
send them to privat(? schools l'un by entrepreneurs, even though they are usually 
very expenSl\re. 
At the theoretical level litt le has been done to explore the Hukou system's effects 
on China's labor market. Apart from the work by Laing (Park et Wang), another 
approach was proposed by Whalley et Zhang (2007). In this model they simulated 
a general equilibrium model incorporating specific factor inputs and downward 
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sloping marginal labor products, and confirmed that the Hukou system was re­
sponsible for general increases in wage inequality in China. The approach we have 
applied in this paper that differs from that found in the theoretical literature in 
that worker heterogeneity is a key factor when assigning workers to each sector. 
2.3 Madel 
The structure of the model is essentia.lly b&:ied on Laing (Park et Wang) with the 
worker heterogeneity approach taken from Albrecht (Navarro et Vroman). 
2.3.1 Basic environment 
Consider a continuous time economy in which workers and firms are risk neutral 
and discount their future payoffs at the rate r. The economy is divided into two 
regions, the rural sector and the urban sector. Normalizing the total labor force 
to one, if N is assumed to be the mass of residents who are legally obliged to 
live in the rural sector then the mass of workers permitted to move to the city is 
thus 1 - N. One way for the Chinese government to reform the Hukou system in 
favor of rural Hukou holders is tô allow more workers ta live in the city, i.e., that 
is to decrease N. The rural labor market is perfectly competitive where there is 
no unemployment while the urban labor market is frictional where job search is 
costly for bath firm and worker, and a worker meets a firm by a random matching 
process. 
\t\Torkers arc different in terms of their residency status: (i) urban Hukou holder 
denoted by the superscript C; and (ii) rural Hukou holder denoted by M. If a rural 
Hukou holder moves ta the city or A. mb~m Hukou holder moves to the countrysiàe, 
both are considered as illegal migrants and thus two-way migration can take place. 
For each residency status C and M, there is a continuum type of workers with 
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each type being denoted by y and drawn from its specifie cumulative distribution 
function CG(y) and CM(y) respectively. These features make our model different 
from the LP\i\T mode!. In particular, we assume that both CC (y) and CM (y) are 
the standard uniform distribution over [0; 1]. 
Denoted the mass of rural worker, urban employed "vorker and urban unemployed 
worker by (Na, E, U) respectively, we have: 
Migration is based on the expected value across regions. In steady-state equilib­
rium, there is no migration pel' se. Otherwise, a mass of workers would jump from 
one sector to another. As such, this paper is not a typical behavioral rural-urban 
migration model as the cla.ssical Harris-Torado mode!. It is not that agents ::l.r8 
born in a location (rural or urban) and with a y and then decide to migrate or 
not; rather it is a model where a worker, born with a type y, chooses a sector to 
live in. That means, more highly ~killed worker is more likely to be found in the 
urban areas, and a worker chooses to move to the countryside because living in 
the city would not necessarily be a better option. 
When applying for a job, a11 agents must present their Hukou status. Illegal 
migrants in the urban area can search for job but if they successfu11y find one, 
they suffer faster job break-up rate due to the enforcement of the Hukou law. 
Therefore, decreasing the law enforcement is another way that helps rural Hukou 
holders establishing their life in the urban areas where job pay is genera11y higher 
than in the rural areas. 
Beside the assumption of perfect competition in the rurallabor market, we assume 
that every worker regardless of his productivity and residency status earns the 
same income. If the agriculture production function is Ya = AaNt, where Na = 
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N~ + N~1, A a > 1 is the agriculture production technology parameter and cP < 1 
refiects decreasing marginal return of labor; then agriculture output pel' worker is 
therefore: 
= Yu = A (Nc + NiV1)rJ>-i (2.1 ) Ya N a a a . 
Q. 
This equation has an intuitive interpretation: given the fixed amount of land 
available for production, the greater number of rural residents, the lower income 
earned by each worker in the rural area. 
In the urban area, there is an infinite numberof firms that can hire both types 
of Hukou status. There is a mass of V vacant positions and each position costs c 
amounts of money. AIso, firms can freely enter into the urban labor market and 
can exit it without cost. With the aggregate mass of unemployed workers in the 
economy is U = UC + UM, the number of hires is a function of both U and V and 
is denoted by m( U, V). As a standard assumption, the matching function takes 
the Cobb-Douglas form: 
where /.L measures the matching efficiency and T) the unemployment elasticity with 
respect to match. Define f(e) and q(e) the rate at which a unemployed worker 
and a firm contact the other party where e = VlU is called the labor market 
tightness. Since firms can contact both legal and illegal worker, given q(e), the 
probability a firm meets an illegal worker is: 
P = Ur: + UM· 
Upon a successful match, firm pays an illegal worker a fixed wage, and a legal 
worker a Nash bargaining wage. The assumption of fixed wage received by illegal 
workers regardless of their productivity might not be realistic but there are some 
reasons to make it. For example, firms hiring illegal workers know that those 
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workers don't have urban Hukou status so that firms want to extract more surplus 
from the match relationship and therefore pay fixed wage. Another possibility is 
that before relocating to the city, rural migrants might accept an expected fixed 
a.mount of income in the hope that later they can get the urban residency. 
If we assume s is the probability legal workers lose their job then there IS a 
higher probability s + h that their illegal counterparts should lose their, due to 
the Hukou system. For n~asons of simplicity, both sand h are exogenous, as 
the firm's job destruction behavior and the city's enforcement behavior are not 
explicitly modeled in this context. 
2.3.2 Steady-state values 
Since the rural labor market is perfectly competitive, the steady-state ftow value 
of an individual rural worker is thus his income: 
r A(y) = Ya, 
where Ya is given by Eq. (2.1), reflecting the assumption that every worker in the 
rural area regardless of his procluctivity and Hukou status earns the same fixed 
mcome. 
Let P(y) be the value of a urban firm employing a type y worker and Jv be the 
value of a vacant position. Let (Wt(y), Si(y)) be the values of a worker of type y 
who is employed and unemployed in the urban area respectively, where i = C, fvJ. 
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For the category C, the fiow value functions can be written as 
rJ C (y) Aly - w(y) + s[V - JC(y)J, 
rWc(y) w(y) + s[SC(y) - WC (y)], 
rSc (y) b + f(B)[WC(y) - SC(y)] 
Eq. (2.2) states that a urban firm hiring a urban Hukou holder of type y is given 
a fiow output Aly where Al is the technology parameter, and in the case of match 
dissolved at rate s, the firm incurs a capitalloss of Jv - JC(y). An urban Hukou 
worker is paid a wage w(y) depending on his type, and the match can be broken 
at rate s. A unemployed worker holding legal urban Hukou enjoys a non-market 
income band finds job opportunity at rate J( B) and if the opportunity is taken, 
he realizes a capital gaïn of WC(y) - SC(y). 
For the category M, the fiow values Me given by: 
rJM(y) = Aly - Ya + (s + h)[Jv - JM(y)] if Aly ::::: Ya; ootherwise, 
rWM(y) = Ya + (s + h)[SM (y) - WM (y)] if Aly ::::: Ya; ootherwise, 
rSM(y) = f(B)[WM(y) - SM(y)] if Aly ::::: Ya; ootherwise. 
which differ from those of category C in three points. First, an illegal migrant 
is paid a fixecl income Ya if he successfully fincls an urban job, indepenclent of 
his productivity. Firms hire illegal workers only if the match surplus is positive, 
J 111 (y) ::::: o. Since the economy has an infinite number of firms and entry is 
costless, therefore the value of posting a vacancy is zero in stpady-state equilibrium 
(Jv = 0). The condition needed to form a firm-illegal worker pair is thus A1y ::::: Ya. 
Otherwise, it is not worth for a firm to hire illegal workers. Second, the probability 
a legal rural Hukou holder looses his job is higher than the legal city Hukou 
counterpart. Here the aclclitional probability of match break-up h is captured by 
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Hukou law enforcement. Finally, there is no unemployment benefits distributed 
to illegal unemployed workers. ln ~quilibrium, it is expected that these three flow 
values cannot be equal to zero. 
A vacant firm's flow value does not depend on y since the firm does not know in 
advance what type of worker it \vill meet, hence 
where p is the proportion of sem'ching workers who are illegal urban Hukou. ln 
this flow value, the expectation operator must be taken into consideration across 
the distribution type y among the unemployed as a firm may meet either a low 
productivity worker, and in this case it is not worth forming a match. ln the 
equilibrium, free entry of firms drives Jv to zero. 
2.3.3 Legal employed's wage determination 
Given Jv = 0, a legal Hukou worker-firm pair in the urban sector generates a 
total matched surplus WC (y) - SC (y) + JC (y). Let f3 be the worker's bargaining 
power, then the wage a legal ci ty Hukou employed worker earns, w (y), becomes the 
solution to the following Nash sharing rule maxw(y) [WC (y) - SC(y)].B JC(y)l-.B. 
Solving this optimization problem yields 
(2.2) 
2.3.4 No-migration conditions 
Notice that most migration models do not impose an equilibrium condition that 
requires no migration can take place as they are naturally behavioral models that 
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focus on individuals' migration decision. An individual decides to migrate from 
one place to another if the net ben~fits from migration exceed the migration costs. 
It turns out that in this kind of model there is a scenario in which ail rural residents 
will migrate to the urban areas whenever the net benefits from migration exceed 
the migration costs. In our model however, there is no migration in the steady­
state equilibrium, i.e., not ail rural residents will migrate to the urban sector and 
not all urban residents will migrate to the rural sector, even though expected-value 
differences between two regions are present. 
Our model context is the one in which a worker, born with a type !j, chooses 
a sector to live in. That means, more highly skilled workers are more likely 
to be found in the urban areas while low skill workers in the other. Thus in 
equilibrium, there is a productivity threshold level for rural residents yM at which 
the worker li! is indifferent between the city and the countryside. Similarly for 
urban residents, a productivity thr·eshold level yC can also be identified. These 
two cutoff productivities must satisfy: 
rA(yM) + Z rSM (yM), (2.3) 
rA(yc) + Z rSc(yc). (2.4) 
Eqs. (2.3) & (2.4) are the so-called no-migration (or no-arbitrage) conditions. 
Since rA(y) = Ya for every y, this implies that SM(yM) = SC(yC). The flow 
values and the Nash bargaining wage given in the two previous sections allow us 
to write explicitly the fhw values of a urban unemployed work(:l fOl each Hukou 
status as follows: 
rS M (y) = 
(r+8)b+f:lf(0) A 1 yrSC(y) = 
r+8+/3f(0) 
- -
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In equilibrium, still (y) cannot be equal to zero because otherwise there will be no 
rural residents living in the city. Hence, the cutoff productivity yC is determined 
by equalizing Sllll (y) = SC (y) which yields 
C r+s+(3f(B) Yo (r+s)by = x------'---------'----- (2.5) 
r + s + h + f(e) (3A J (3f(B)A 1 
The second cutoff productivity yM is obtained from Eq. (2.1). In fact, the number 
of rcsidents working in the rural sector is Na = Ntl + Nf! = NG(yM) + (1 ­
N)G(yC) = Nyi\il + (1 - N)yC, implying that 
1 (rs:a-z) &-} (1 N)yCyM = -'-__-'---- _ (2.6)N 
where SM = SM (y) which is shown to be indf.pf.ndent of type y. In equilibrium, 
it is expected that yM > yC because ot.herwise some urban Hukou holders who 
are more skilied than some rural migranl.s are found to be in the rural sector. üb­
viously, this case does not make sense. As Eq. (2.6) shows a negative relationship 
between Y/'il and Yc, meaning that more urban Hukou holders deciding to move 
to the rural sector is associated with less illegal migrants in the urban sector since 
this sector is not attractive to live in. 
2.3.5 Labor market equilibrium 
Before closing the model by defining a urban labor market equilibrium, one needs 
to find the free condition. Since entry is costless but urban firms pay search costs 
to fil! vacant positions, the free entry drives J1) to zero. Substitutions give: 
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where g~(y) is the distribution of type among the unemployed workers for each 
Hukou status for i = {C, M}. This is because on-the-job-search is excluded and 
only unemployed workers may fil! vacancies. Bayes' Law al!ows that 
_ Jyi ui(y)dG'(y). liwhere ui(y) is the unemployment share of type y and u - l-Gi(yt) lS tlle 
unemployment rate for i = {C, M}. Let ei(y) be the steady-state employment 
share of type y in the urban area respectively for i = {C, M}, it follows that ui(y + 
ei(y) = 1. In steady-state equilibrium, the flows into and out of unemployment 
should be equal, so that 
s+h(s + h)eM (y) f(e)uJ\tI(y) ~ u M (y) s+h+f(O) , 
sseC (y) j(e)uC(y) ~ uC(y) = 
s+/(O) . 
The total mass of urban unemployed workers is obtained by âggregating across 
the population 
and the urban unemployment rate is 
u 
u= . 
1- Na 
Let define a labol market equilibrium as belo"v: 
Definition: A urban labor market equilibrium consists of a triple (yC, y/II, e) 
satisfying the two cutotf-productivity equations (2.5) and (2.6) and the fcee 
entry condition (2.7). 
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Given that, one could proceed to study the effects of labor market policy on its 
outcome. We are particularly interested in analysing how the Hukou law affects 
the urban unemployment rate and the social welfare. Let define a social welfare 
function by the sum of the utilities of the employed and the unemployed, the 
production of the firms net of search costs as follows: 
The first term in the social welfare function represents the total agriculture output 
produced by Na workers (the sum of rural Hukou stayers (N:!) and a proportion 
of urban Hukou migrants (N/:l). The second and the third term arc the total 
production both illegal and legal urban employed workers produce. Note that 
the totallabor costs are cancelled out because these costs are directly transferred 
from the urban firms to the urban employed workers. The fourth is the benefits 
that only legal workers in the urban areas can obtain from the government. And 
the last term is the total costs of filling V (= eU) vacant positions. 
2.4 N umerical analysis 
The numerical analysis is based on a comparison of steady states. The model 
parameters are calibrated based mainly on the data provided by the Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP) and the 2007 OECD Employment Outlook. 
The first, a Chinese household survey which was constructed for only two years, 
1995 and 2002, contains mainly information on both rural and urban individual 
income. In 1995, the CHIP conducted a survey of 7998 rural households (with 
34739 individuals) in 19 provinces plus 6931 urban households (with 21,698 mem­
bers) in 11 provinces. In 2002, the survey was conducted with a bit larger sample 
of rural and urban individuals with an extent to provide information on about 
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5327 rural-urban migrants. 
In China, the official urban unemployment rates reported annually by the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics remain around 4%. The unemployed categoryex­
cluded many workers since these numbers comprised large proportions of workers 
laid-off from the SOEs; certain workers forced into early retirement before their 
official retirement age (60 for men and 58 for women) who may be seeking work 
but are denied registration at public employment offices; rural migrants, school­
leavers and first market entrants looking for jobs. Data on unemployment in 
developing countries has proven to be of pOOl' quality. For this reason, we use 
the 2007 OECD Employment Outlook, a dataset contains information for three 
sectors: rural, informai and formaI. We refer to informai (formai) job defined by 
OECDas the job occupied by illegal (legal) workers to calibrate the share of rural 
Hukou holders and the unofficial unemployment rate, though doing so is not ideal 
2.4.1 Calibration strategy 
The model parameters are then calibrated on an annual basis with the list com­
prises: (N,Aa ,A i ,<fy,f.L,T],T,b,s,h,Yo,Z,,6). Particularly, the year chosen for cal­
ibration is 2002. For a summary of how these parameters are computed, see Table 
2.1. 
As observed, the annual China interest rate is r = 0.0531. We base on 2007 OECD 
Employment Outlook's estimation, which is based on the 2000 China Population 
Census, to calculate the proportion of workers who are legal rural residents. In the 
OECD report for 2000, about 82 millions people are in the category of informai 
employment which 1S definprl 8.:3 the difference bctv,œn the official LuLal empioy­
ment figures and urban registered employment. According to OECD, those 82 
millions people composed mainly of i) rurai migrant workers who because of the 
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Hukou registration system could not work in registered enterprises; and ii) laid­
off workers from state enterprises who took informai employment on a temporary 
basis while remaining nominally attached to their previous work units in order to 
obtain welfare benefits and re-ernployment opportunities. With the 2000 level of 
rural employment level of about 489 millions and a totallabor force of 741 in the 
same year, the proportion of workers who are obliged to stay in the rural sector 
N is about 72%. Since 2002 is the year for calibrating the model parameters, the 
extrapolation allow us to set N = 70% for 2002. 
The following parameters can be computed directly from the 2002 CHIP data set: 
(b, Yo, 5). First, the 2002 CHIP questionnaire asked urban individuals about their 
income, benefits and unemployment duration. From this sample, we extract only 
those workers who are currently employed, and for those reporting permanent and 
long-term contracts, the average annual net wage they declared is about 11 ,200 
yuan. Those with no employment contracts earned about 8,000 yuan per year, 
hence we set Yo = 8,000. Given that only small number of sample's respondents 
receiving unemployment income and their relatively small earned income, we set 
b = O. 
The output elasticity of employrnent in the rural sector cP = 0.11 is from Fan 
et Pardey (1997) who estimate this parameter from a panel data of set of seven 
regional agricultural productions during the 1965-1993. The remaining parameters 
(A a , Al, M, cP, h, c) are computed as follow. The 2002 CHIP provides information 
about rural income per capita, 3700 yuan, and the share of rural employment in 
the labor force obtained From the OECD Employment Outlook, 63%. Through 
applying Eq. (2.1) we can calculate Aa and hence Aa = 2500 yuan. 
We follow Rickne (2010) who uses firm-Ievel data conducted by the China National 
Bureau of Statistics covering ail the SOEs and ail other enterprises for which 
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annual sales were above 5 million yuans. She reports the distributions of regional 
unemployment and vacancy rates for the 2001-2005 period, and from her sample 
we can compute the labor market tightness for 2002. The result is of about 
2.14. Following the literature on search models applied to developing countries 
context, we set worker's bargaining power at f3 = 0.5, and the matching elasticity 
Tl = (3 to satisfy the Hosios efficiency condition. Given the 2002 CHIP survey 
questioned urban individuals on their unemployment spell and among employed 
workers with permanent contracts, 381 month is the average duration. Thus 
fte) = 3';' annually. Given ,8 = Tl = 0.5 and 8 = 2.14, the matching efficiency is 
then fJ, = !(8)/81 -7) = 2.15. 
Official unemployment rate in the urban areas reported by the Chinese government 
is 4% yearly so that we choose the rate at which an urban Hukou worker looses 
his job is s = 0.13. That implics that legal job lasts about 7.9 years which is 
consistent with the 2002 CHIP survey that provides information on employment 
spell of urban workers with permanent contract. A long employment period might 
be associated with certain government policies applied by China's Communist 
Party regarding workers in the SOEs. Another reason might be that SOE workers 
would prefer to stay and benefit from social programs rather than move to the 
private sector, due to the weak employment protection available to the latter. 
Vle chose the technology parameter Al and the separation rate that captures the 
Hukou enforcement in the urban area h to target the 2002 total unemployment 
rate of about 8% provided by OECD and the 2002 average urban income of 11,200 
yuan calculated from the HIP 2002. From the labor mô.rket equilibrium, ",..c can 
compute the average wage a urban Hukou worker could get 
C
" r l (' e ( '1./ ) , , ,
Hlw) = j w y)-------C-.9\y)ay, 
yC e 
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where w(y) is the Nash bargaining solution given by (2.2) and e:tlJ } g(y) reflects 
the distribution of type among the urban Hukou employed. By solving the system 
of the urban unemployment rate equation and the above average wage equation, 
we obtained Al :::::; 26,000 yuan and h = 0.35. 
Given s = 0.13 as calibrated above, the average employment duration for an illegal 
worker is then slh = 2.08 years. This job duration roughly corresponds to the 
average estimate provided by Knight et Yueh (2004) for Chinese rural migrants 
in 2000 (2.2 years) who work in the urban sector. Our calibration suggests that a 
legal job lasts about six times longer than an illegal job. 
To compute the migration costs we use the rural-urban no-migration condition 
(2.3) which leads to Z = 3,200 yuan. As a standard procedure for pinning down 
the labor market tightness value, we chose c = 8,020 yuan. The next section 
provides our quantitative results based on the baseline parameters. 
2.4.2 Simulation results 
The effects of relaxing the H ukou law 
We start by computing the model equilibrium for the baseline case, following the 
parameterization established in the previcius section. The equilibrium values are 
reported in first column of Table 2.2 where the market tightness, the urban legal 
and total unemployment rate are targeted. The value equilibrium value of yi\lJ 
indicates that among the rural Hukou holders (accounts for 70% of the totallabor 
force), 77% of them stay in the countryside while at the same time the l'est of them, 
23% decides to move to the city areas without urban Hukou permit. Similarly, 
among the urban Hukou holders (30% of the tot.allabor force), 30% of them moves 
to the countryside while 70% stays in the city. Note that the condition requires 
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Table 2.1 Annual parameters 
Parameter Meaning Source/target 
r = 0.0513 interest rate National Bureau of Statistics of ( 
b=O unemployment incarne 2002 CHIP data 
Yo = 8,000 yuan mean wage for no-contract workers income 2002 CHIP data 
Aa = 2,500 yuan rural prod. technology rural income per capit.a 
Al = 26,000 yuan urban prod. technology mean wage for permanent contra, 
Z = 3,200 yuan migration cost No-migration condition 
s = 0.13 job separation rate for urban Hukou official unemployment rate 
/3 = 0.5 worker's bargaining power Albrecht (Navarro et Vroman)
 
17 = 0.5 unemployment elasticity Hosios' efficient condition
 
cP = 0.11 rural labor elasticity Fan et Pardey (1997)
 
h = 0.35 law's enforcement urban unemployment rate
 
J.l = 2.15 matching efficiency
 
c = 8,020 yuan vacancy cost mean tightness
 
1/ f(e) = 3.81 months urban unemployment spell 2002 CHIP data 
E(w) = 11,200 yuan average wage of legal workers 2002 CHIP data 
u = 8% urban unemployment rate üECD Employment Ot::tlook 200 
7J = 2.14 mean tightness Rickne (2010) 
Na = 63% 2002 rural employment share üECD Employment Outlook 200 
a rural Hukou worker being hired by urban firms is his productivity is at least as 
high as yO/Al = 0.31. The value yM = 0.77 satisfies this condition. However, 
yC < yO/Al meaning thatfirms hiring legal workers whose productivity is low 
still gain positive match surplus. 
Consider now the effects of relaxing the Hukou law by decreasing either the law 
f h h h' lUI . 1 , ,r r.' ., . - . ·-o~·en.orcement '" or t ,c nUInvcr 01 rÜra, UüJ{OU reSlOeuL::i IV. 1:' IrSt, Keepmg JV = ( '10 
while reducing h from the baseline case until h = O. This is shown in the left part 
of Table 2.2. As the law's enforcement is relaxed, the share of the rural resident 
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going to move to the city increases substantially from 23% to 45% if the law is 
completely removed. The share of urban Hukou holders going to move to the 
countryside slightly decreases from 30% to 32%, reflecting the fact that urban­
sector firms would benefit more from hiring illegal workers and thus creating 
disadvantage for legal urban residents. The part of the labor force decides to 
locate in the rural sector therefore decreases with the relaxation of the law's 
enforcement. 
The most interesting result in this exercise however is the increase in labor mar­
ket tightness, and this is explained below. Relaxing the law has two simultaneous 
effects. First, it makes the urban sector more attractive to rural workers, mak­
ing the flood of rural-urban migrants. Second, the rent urban firms extract from 
illegal workers is higher chan that from legal workers because the wage paid to 
illegal workers is fixed so that, according to Pissarides (2000), firms would natur­
ally respond by posting more vacancies pel' unemployed. The total positive effect 
on job creation (B t) reflects the fact that the increase in the number of vacant 
positions appears to be more important than the increase in the number of un­
employed. As a result, the average wage of an employed worker who holds the 
urban Hukou status rises. 
The last raw of the first part shows an interesting result where the value of the 
social \velfare is negatively correlated with h. This is largely due to the substantial 
increase in the number of illegal hires that dominates the fall of legal hires with 
the total cost of filling 1/ vacant positions. 
An alternative choice for the Chinese Government to relax the Hukou law is to 
allow more rural residents to establish their life in the urban sector. The first and 
fourth column of Table 2.2 show the effect of decreasing N from 70% to 60% while 
keeping the law enforcement h = 0.35 unchanged. The growth of legal residents 
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Table 2.2 Simulation results 
N = 70% 
Baseline 
h=0.35 h=0.2 h=O h=0.35 
N = 60% 
h=0.2 h=O 
Tightness e 2.14 7.58 23.8 1.14 4.15 13.7 
Share of rural Hukou yM 
Share of no rural Hukou yC 
Share of rural labor force Na 
0.77 
0.30 
0.63 
0.61 
0.31 
0.52 
0.55 
0.32 
048 
0.98 
0.29 
0.71 
0.70 
0.31 
0.55 
0.59 
0.32 
0.49 
Urban iUegal unemployment rate uNI 
Urban legal unemployment rate liC 
Urban unemployment rate u 
0.13 
0.04 
0.08 
0.053 
0.022 
0.039 
0.012 
0.012 
0.012 
0.173 
0.054 
0.059 
0.07 
0.029 
0.045 
0.016 
0.016 
0.016 
Ave. wage of legal workers E(w) 11,200 11,390 11,485 1 11,052 11 ,280 11,410 
Social welfare SW 4,972 5,622 6,261 
1 
5,417 5,886 6,516 
in the urban sector creates a sort of congestion effect, pushing certain urban legal 
residents into the rural sector as yC increases and retaining legal rural residents as 
yM also increases. In this case, the number of persons working in the rural sector 
goes from 63% (baseline case) up to 70% (0.98 x 0.6+0.29 x 0.4). This congestion 
effect might explain why both labor market tightness and urban unemployment 
rate faU. Interestingly, the substantial rise in rural labor force, though decreases 
the average wage earned by legal urban employed, increases the social welfare. 
Comparing the second and the fifth column (h = 0.2) or the third and the sixth 
(h = 0) tells us that aUowing more urban Hukou holders would only increase the 
urban unemployment rate if the law enforcement in the urban areas is relaxed. If 
N is kept at 60%, the interpretation of the right part of Table 2.2 is similar to the 
left. 
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Unemployment insurance 
As a result of the SOE reforms implemented in the early 1980s; many workers 
found themselves without employment. Thus in 1986 the Chinese government 
launched an unemployment benefit program, known as Interim Provisions on Un­
employment Insurance of Staff of State Enterprises (Interim Provisions), which 
was intended to coyer the basic needs of temporarily unemployed workers. Under 
this new program; a1l staff contributions were set at 1% of total payr01l, yet cov­
erage granted to alimited number of SOE staff categories only (see Lee (2000))). 
From 1993 to 1999, coverage was extended to three more SOE staff categories. 
The most recent UI program was reformed in 1999 and the basis of the system in 
effect today where in the urban areas firms in a1l ownership sectors are required 
to provide UI coverage to their employees (see Rickne (2010)). This system is 
financed by firm contributions amounting to about 2% of total payr01l, and from 
workers who contribute 1% of their wages. The benefit level is set by govern­
ments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities at a level in between 
the minimum wage and the minimum living standard of urban residents. It is 
not primarily calculated based on earnings, but on the total period of continu­
ously paid contributions. As such, the income protection of the program is low, 
representing a replacement rate of 14.7% in 2005. 
According to the Director General of the China's Institute for Labor Study of 
the f\/Iinistry of Ruman ResoUTces and Social Security - You Jun - setting up 
the unemployment insurance system was a historie choice for China. Although 
it guaranteed the basic livelihood of the unemployed and maintained the social 
stability, it provides a weak l'ole in promoting re-employment. 
For this exercise we investigate how labor market outcomes react to this increase 
in unemployment insurance. As mentioned in the calibration strategy section 
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Table 2.3 EfI'ects of rising replacement rate 
N = 70% 
Baseline 
b=O b = lO%E(w) b = 30%E(w) b = 50%E(w) 
Tightness e 2.14 1.80 2.03 2.25 
Share of rural Hukou yM 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.77
 
Share of no rural Hukou yC 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
 
Share of rural labor force Na 0.63 0.649 0.637 0.627
 
Urban illegal unemployment rate uM 0.13 0.143 0.135 0.129
 
C
Urban legal unemployment rate u 0.04 0.043 0.041 0.04
 
Urban unemployment rate u 0.08 0.083 0.081 0.078
 
Ave. wage of legal workers E(w) 11,200 11,261 11,446 11,612 
Social welfare SW 4,972 4,935 5,028 5,107 
concerning the value of b, the number of people receiving unemployment incarne 
in the 2002 CHIP survey is relatively small compared to sample observations, and 
the income they get from it is also very small. 'Ne calculate the replacement rate 
by dividing the unemployment benefits b by legal workers' average wage E(w), 
and then reported the efI'ects of varying the replacement rate from 10% ta 50% in 
Table 2.3. 
Overall, l'ising unemployment benefits is found to have little efI'ect on labor market 
outcomes and social welfare. Tt has bath direct and indirect. efI'ects on job creation. 
First the direct efI'ect results from reductions in the total surplus of a legal match 
and therefore firms have less incentive ta hire legal workers. Second, the indirect 
efI'ect is a by-pronllC't of the imprO'.!ement in the qüality of che illegal workers 
(yM t). The decrease (increase) in e when benefits increase ta is a result of the 
direct (indirect) efI'ect governing the indirect (direct) efI'ect. 
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Technological change 
In this exerClse we study how the equilibrium reacts to changes in aggregate 
productivity Al, Results are reported in Table 2.4. An increase in production 
technology implies higher employment in the urban scctor since both yC and 
yM decrease, higher probability of finding urban job and therefore lovver urban 
unemployment rate. The intuition is that improvement in production techno­
logy make legal worker's outside options less attractive, and alternatively, more 
rural migrants will search for urban sector opportunities. The average quality of 
labor supply is worsening, making urban sector firms less incentive to create jobs. 
Simultaneously, higher aggregate productivity increases a firm's surplus and thus 
more job creation takes place. The rise in esuggests that the change in aggregate 
productivity governs the change in average ski11 level. Even for small variation 
in the market tightness, both wage of legal workers and social welfare increase 
substantially following a positive aggregate productivity shock. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We started building the lllodel based on the study by Laing (Park et Wang) on 
how the Hukou household registration system impacts the Chinese urban unem­
ployment rate through migration channel. We then incorporated their model in 
the worker heterogeneityenvironment introduced by Albrecht (Navarro et Vro­
man). Our model is typical1y not a behavioral model of migration as the classical 
Harris-Todaro model in the sense that even though expected-income differences 
between rural and urban areas exist, there should be no migration in equilibrium 
due to labor market friction and turnover in the urban areas, making migration 
decision costly. Our main finding is that the relaxation of the Hukou law itself by 
either decreasing the law enforcement or allowing more people to live in the city 
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Table 2.4 Effects of increase in production technology 
N = 70% 
Baseline 
Al = 26, 000 Al t by 1% Al t by 5% Al t by lD% 
Tightness e 2.14 2.33 2.97 3.70 
Share of rural Hukou yM 
Share of no rural Hukou yC 
Share of rural labor force Na 
0.77 
0.30 
0.63 
0.76 
0.29 
0.623 
0.74 
0.28 
0.603 
0.72 
027 
0.587 
Urban illegal unemployment rate uM 
Urban legal unemployment rate uC 
Urban unemployment rate u 
0.13 
0.04 
0.08 
0.128 
0.038 
0.077 
0.115 
0.034 
0.071 
0.104 
0.031 
0.065 
Ave. wage of legal workers E(w) 11 ,200 Il,373 11,965 12,683 
Social welfare SW 4,972 5,042 5,277 5,538 
or both at the same time resulted in a lower unemployment in the urban sector. 
While Laing (Park et Wang) resulted in a daim that relaxing the law's enforcement 
would imply an increase in urban unemployment rate and make it difficult to find 
jobs in the urban sector , our finding showed the opposite. This is due to the 
fact that the labor market 's openness for illegal workers wouId encourage them to 
join this market and put less pressure on the principal market for legal workers. 
From a policy perspective, China is certainly facing many challenges in terms 
of growth in informai employment and large formai-informai flow and high urban 
unemployment rate. To deal with this problem, our study suggest.s that ct relevant 
policy should be adapted to abolish the Hukou system. 
CHAPTER III 
FRICTIONAL '~AGE DISPERSION AND THE ROLE 
OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
This paper aims to explain why \vorker having similar characteristics 
are paid differently through applying a search model with asymmetric 
information. The reason is through possessing private information, 
both firms and workers will make only modest wage offers to avoid 
separation, a mechanism that disperses the wage distribution. 
Keywords: mean-min ratio, asymmetric information, take-it-or-leave­
it offers 
3.1 Introduction 
Why are similar workers paid differently? For a long time, this question has 
attracted numerous theorists to provide a convincing theory of wage dispersion 
(Mortensen (2003)). A r~ent work by Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) finds that 
the amount of wage dispersion derived from numerous classes of search models 
is relatively small as compared to that found in the data. They refer to wage 
dispersion as frictional wage dispersion and define a direct measure called the 
mean-min ratio, i.e., the average wage divided by the reservation wage. Accord­
ing to the authors, an ideal empirical estimate of the frictional wage dispersion 
68 
"requires the empirical distribution of wages for identical workers employed in the 
same narrowly defined labor market"; and because of measurement errors and 
incomplete information often presented in individual surveys, "the most common 
measures are estimates of residual wage dispersion from a Mincerian wage regres­
sion with as many control variables as possible". Empirical research has shown 
that observable worker characteristics such as education, experience, age, gender, 
occupation, etc can only explain up to 30 percent of the wage variation. The re­
maining unobservable (unexplained) accounts for 70 percent and is often referred 
to the residual wage dispersion. A mean-min ratio based on residual inequality 
therefore represents upper bounds for actual frictional wage dispersion. 
The key fac;t that explains the failure of the standard model in amplifying fric­
tional wage dispersion is the high value of non-market time during unemployment 
in the data. Because in general workers are impatient in getting a job so they 
rriay forgo higher wage opportunities if they were waiting longer for them AI-­
ternatively, if search cost efforts are very high then unemployed workers become 
extremely impatient then they are willing to reduce their reservation wage, which 
in tum rises wage dispersion. According to Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) 's cal­
ibration for the US and Europe, t.he value of non-market time must be implausibly 
low (negative indeed) in order to bring the model prediction closer to the data. 
Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) also examine four class of search models including 
(i) imperfect correlation between job values and initial wagc; (ii) risk aversion; 
(iii) directed search; and (iv) on-the-job search, and find that the most promising 
direction is on-the-job-search models but it still nf'f'ris substantial improvements. 
The approach taken in this paper is different from those suggested by Hornstein 
(Krusell et Violante), that inspired by Delacroix et Wasmer (2006)'s two-side 
asymmetric information model with the take-it-or-Ieave-it bilateral bargaining to 
address whether this kind of mechanism can explain frictional wage dispersion. 
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Delacroix and 'Nasmer introduce asymmetric information model to differentiate 
the destinations for worker outflows from employment, the quit and layoff to 
unemployment and the job-to-job flows. and then compare these flows between 
Europe and the V.S. The model presented in this paper differs from theirs in the 
following characteristics: neither on-the-job search nor fi.ring costs nor investment 
in human capital is designed for the mode!. 
We find that under plausible parameters, the model is able to reach closely the 
amount of wage dispersion found in the Current Population Survey. The intu­
ition is that in a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer environment, one party has to take into 
account of the private information the other party possesses. For example when 
a firm makes an offer, it does not know in advance the offer is accepted for sure. 
Indeed a firm posting vacancies must take expectation over a worker's private 
values. Because the firm knows its own productivity value so that it will make an 
generous offer if its productivity is high as to avoid the offer rejected. The same 
principle applies to the case where workers make offer but in the inverse sense. 
In other words, workers with high utility from employment make modest offers 
or low wages. As a result, accepted wages must be a subset of offered wages and 
the mechanism described here helps to understand why dispersion exists among 
workers with similar characteristics. Our results are consistent with the empir­
ical work by Abowd (Kramarz et Margolis) that studies a panel data of over one 
million French workers from more that five hundred thousand employing firms. 
The authors find that more productive firms pay higher wages after controlling 
for person effects and worker heterogeneity after controlling for firm effects also 
provides an important source of wage differentials within an industry. 
The idea that asymmetric information generates wage dispersion is credited to 
Burdett et Judd (1983)'s work. In their model, sellers do not know how many other 
offers their potential buyers may have, which discourages them from demanding 
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the highest possible priee. With sellers playing the workers' l'ole, the argument is 
obviously similar to our framework. 
Mortensen -(2003) argues that wage dispersion in the context of Burdett et Judd 
(1983) should refiect productivity dispersion in the sense that more productive em­
ployers offer higher pay to attract and retain more workers. Friction and turnover 
presented in labor market however prevent workers fiow from less productive to 
more productive employers. But productivity dispersion itself is not enough as 
shown by Hornstein (Krusell et Violante). It seems that the standard model is 
missing at least one element. Abowd (Kramarz et Margolis) find that worker het­
erogeneity after controlling for observed characteristics provides a more important 
source of wage variation in France than firm heterogeneity. For this reason, utility 
dispersion among unemployed workers is an additional source of heterogeneity in 
our mode!. If worker's utility from employment is high enough then he may want 
to lower his reservation wage. 
In Section 3.2, we try to estimate a measure of frictional wage dispersion. Section 
3.3 examines the failure of search models in explaining frictional wage dispersion. 
Section 3.4 describes the mode!. In section 3.5, a calibration exercise is carried 
out and the model's results are produced. Section 3.6 draws some conclusions. 
3.2	 Residual wage dispersion as an estimate of frictional 
wage dispersion 
Since frictiona.1 wage dispersion refiects wage dispersion for ex ante homogenous 
workers, to estimate it from microdata, one should control for as many variables 
as possible. This qüitc difficült givcn the available inforn1ation provided by indi­
vidual surveys. We estimate residual wage dispersion throughout the CPS March 
Supplement and refer to residual wage dispersion as friction al wage dispersion. 
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Because the CPS raw data contains various types of information and the ques­
tionnaires have changed over time, the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of 
the March CUlTent Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS), a friendlier version of the 
CPS, will be applied. Indeed, supplemental inquiries on special topics were ad­
ded for particular months, and to make data more compatible, the IPUMS-CPS 
harmonizes the CPS raw data to produce a consistent and user-frienelly version 
for 1962 to 2008. Unfortunately, sorne important variables needed in our analysis, 
such as hourly wage or union membership, are only available from 1990 onward. 
We therefore consider only the period 1990-2008. To minimize measurement error 
bias, we restrict the sample to civilian adults (children and Armed Forces mem­
bers are ail dropped) who are currently employed in the non-farm sector. We then 
drop individuals who are currently in school, self-employed and unpaid worker, 
arid whose hourly wage are top-coded ($99.99 an hour or more) or falls below the 
federal minimum 1983-dollar real wage ($3.35). 
We follow Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) to consider the mean-min ratio 3.'3 a 
measure of frictional wage dispersion. This ratio has not acquired its popularity 
but has been proved to satisfy the five stanelard axioms for" ideal" inequality index 
discussed in Cowell (2000): anonymity; the population principle; scale invariance; 
the principle of transfers; and decomposability. Moreover, the mean-min ratio 
also has similar properties as the 90th - 10th percentile ratio. Analytically, the 
mean-min ratio is the most relevaIlt wage dispersion measure for the class of search 
models because the worker's outside option determines the lowest wage paid while 
the average wage can easily be computed as wage generally follows a particular 
distribution function. Within the framework of search models, the mean-min 
ratio is the most relevant wage dispersion measure, as the worker's outside option 
determines the lowest wage paid while the average wage can easily be computed, 
given that wage generall:y follows a particular distribution function. 
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For each every year during the 1990-2008 period, we run an OLS regression for 
the Mincerian equation 
where Wit is the log of hourly real wage for individual i in year t, (Xt is a vector 
of estimated coefficients for year t and Çit represents individuals' unobservable 
characteristics. The vector controlling the observed factors, X it , represents: 
•	 5 education dummies (high school dropouts, high school graduates , sorne 
college, college graduates and postgraduates), 
•	 a linear and a quadratic term in experience (age-years of education-6) 1 to 
allow for nonlinear effects, 
•	 a dummy for gcnder, 
•	 a dummy for marital status, 
•	 a dummy for union status, 
•	 3 race dummies (white, black, other), 
•	 4 regional dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), 
•	 and 3 occupation dummies (managerial & professional, white collar, and 
blue co11m-). 
On average, these year-hy-year regreqsions yield t n R2 of around 0.35, a value 
commonly agreed upon within empirical analysis on Nfincerian wage regressions, 
l Note that years of schooling were not reported in the data artel' 1991. '1'0 be use<! 
appropriately, _this variable should then be recoded. For example Eckstein et Nagypal (2004) 
assign 10, 12, 14, 16,18 to years of education, varying l'rom high school dropouts to postgraduates 
respectively. 
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as observed characteristics can explain at most 1/3 of the total wage variation. 
In other words, 65% of the wage dispersion is left unexplained and any estimates 
of the residual wage dispersion represents upper bounds for actual frictional wage 
dispersion. 
A measure of residual wage dispersion across workers is calculated by the foliowing 
index2 : 
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of residual wage dispersion estimates within the 
IPUNIS-CPS data and the PSID data employed by Hornstein (Kruseli et Violante). 
However, as Hornstein (Eruseli et Violante) note, information on hourly wages 
may suffer from measurement error bias so that estimates of min wage should 
consider the lst, 5th, and 10th percentiles of the distribution as they are less 
volatile estimators. OveraJI, the amount of residual wage dispersion occurring 
throughout these data are quite large but for an appropriated estimate of frictional 
wage dispersion, one should refer to the ratio of mean wage to the 5th or the 10th 
percentile of the distribution. 
3.3	 Related literature on the mean-min ratio derived from 
search models 
Consider a very simple version of Pissarides (1985) earch model in worker hetero­
geneity environment described in Hornstein (KruseU et Violante). Let p be the 
productivity of a match pair and distributed according to a specifie cdf F(p) with 
2This index is somewhat modified from that defined by Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) 
although they use panel data bl' accounting for the movement around a trend of fixed unobserved 
individual factors .Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) compute an index that is iûit = exp(~,t -~we) 
where ~we = ZZ=l ~idT for e1rery individual. 
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Table 3.1 Average mean-min ratio across data 
. CPS data PSID dataa 
Mean-min 4.09 4.5 
IvIean-lst percentile 2.43 2.8 
Mean-5th percentile 1.91 2.1 
Mean-l0th percentile 1.69 1.75 
Observation/year 9,000 2,500 
Periou 1990-2008 1990-1995 
R2 35-41% 42-45% 
aSource: Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007). 
upper bound pmax . Employed worker is paid hourly wage w(p), which depends on 
match productivity, until separation occurs at exogenous rate s while unemployed 
worker enjoys his non-production income z and is searching for a job. 
Let w = E[wlp 2:: Pt] be the average wage conditional on a match pair where 
Pr is the lowest productivity level allowed to begin or to continue the production 
process, and T the replacement rate once worker and firm separated, i.e., Z = T X w, 
and the minimum wage paid Wr = W(Pr)· Ur = f x [1 - F(Pr)] is the job finding 
rate then, a simple expression for the mean-min ratio is 
- L+l 
Mm = ~ = -,--;'+:-,:5__ 
W'T _1_* + T
r+5 
where T' is the risk-free interest rate, Note that aIl parameters in the mean-min 
ratio can be computed and this ratio for measuring frictional wage dispersion does 
not require any information on F. But how large is the Afm ratio? 
The standard monthly interest rate is 0.0041. Note that the literature still doesn't 
reach a consensus on a specifie estimate for T but most of it values are taken l'rom 
75 
the reasonable range, [0.2; 0.6]. If we take the value of monthly job finding rate 
and separation rate estimated by Shimer (2005a) based on the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data, 0.45 and 0.034 respectively, then the ratio lies in the range: 
045 + 1 0.34 + 1 
0.0041+0034 00041+00341.03 = --=..:...:..:;,:.=.-;;--=..:...:..::....::..-- ~ Mm ~ . 045 . = 1.07. 
0.45 + 0 6 '+ 0 2 00041+0.34' 00041+0.34' 
If we take the value of monthly job finding rate and separation rate estimated by 
Fallick et Fleischman (2004) based on the Current Population Survey data, 0.283 
and 0.013 respectively, then the ratio lies in the range: 
1.02 ~ Mm ~ 1.05. 
Both exercises show that the mean-min ratio derived from the basic search models 
are about twice smaller than that provided by different datasets summarized in 
Table 3.1. Mechanically, the mean-min ratio is small because the job finding rate 
largely dominates the sum of separation rate plus interest rate. One canmeet the 
mean-min ratio to the Census estimate (2.20) by lowering the replacement rate 
T to -4.3. That is an implausible value. Another possible solution is to reduce 
f /(r + s) to 0.1, i.e., the job finding is about 10% of the sum of the separation 
rate and interest rate which is unsupportable by data on worker ftows. 
Let consider now the class of on-the-job-search mode!. Intuitively, the ability to 
search on the job for new employment opportunities makes unemployed workers 
less demanding, which reduces t.heir reservation wage and allows the model to 
generate a higher Mm ratio. To see how the mechanic increases the mean-min 
ratio, consider a slight modification of the basic random matching studied above 
in which employed workers have possibility of searching for other employers as 
described in the Burdett et Mmtensen (1998) mode!. They accept to switch job 
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only if they receive any wage offer above their current wage and let Je be the rate 
at wbich an employed worker contacts another employer. The !VIm ratio has a 
new expresSIOn 
1"-Je + 1 
A1m = r+s+Je 
]*-Je + T 
r+s+ Je 
Taking again the above parameter estimates and adding the worker flows from 
one employer to another also from Fal1ick et Fleischman (2004), which averaged 
2.6% from 1996:1 to 2003:12, the range for Mm ratio now cbanges to 
0.283-0.026 + 1 0.283-0026 + 1 
1.06 = 0.0041+0.013+0.026 <!VI < 0.0041+0.013+0.026 = 1 13 
0.283-0.026 0 6 - m - 0.283-0.026 0 2 " 
0.0041+0.013+0.026 + . 00041+0.013+0026 + . 
Comparing to the estimated range without on-the-job search, although the Mm 
is still far from the empirical one but including on-the-job search in the model 
significantly improves the result. A more sophisticated on-the-job-search model 
with endogenous search effort as in Christensen et al. (2005) can closely match 
the data. To obtain this result, the search cost in their model which makes 
unemployment unattractive relative to employment must be unrealistically large. 
Even in imperfect Bertrand competition model type as in Postel-Vinay et Robin 
(2002) or Cahuc (Postel-Vinay et Robin) where firms are allowed to make coun­
teroffers when there is competition between two employers in contacting a worker, 
the mean-min ratio exhibits virtual1y no improvement. Intuitively, counteroffer 
models may result either in a job-to-job move or in a salary increase on the cur­
rent job, depending on the choice of the worker. If the cost of job-to-job moving 
is high enough then the worker ma)' want to continue with his current employer. 
Therefore, the standard on-the-job search model can only generate little frictional 
wage dispersion. 
Hornstein (Krusell et Violante) also verify the ability of other classes search models 
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such as imperfect correlation between job values and initial wage, risk aversion, 
and directed search, and conclude that frictional wage dispersion is virtually very 
sma.ll in ail of these models. 
Recently, Papp (2009) has developed a general equilibrium model with the on­
the-job search and the counteroffer bargaining mechanism described in Postel­
Vinay and Robin (2002) or Cahuc et al. (2006). In his model, employed workers 
when switching to another employer face a specifie distribution of wage offer that 
depends on the productivity of their former employers rather than a common 
wage offer distribution for both employed and unemployed workers. Wage is 
then mainly dispersed due t.o the heterogeneity of the firm 's productivity. ~/Iore 
precisely, higher productivity expands the wage offer distribution to t.he right 
because job-to-job transitions always fiow from low to high productivity, and 
better outside offers result in higher wages. His model then closely mat.ches the 
amount of wage dispersion found in t.he data. 
3.4 Asymmetric information model 
3.4.1 Assumption 
In the economy, t.here are an infinite number of firms and an infinite number 
of workers. Ali agents are risk-neutral and discount future payoffs at a rate T. 
Workers may be either employed or unemployed. Firms use only labor input to 
produce output, according to a constant return to scale technology. 
Friction in the labor market does not allow instantaneous meet between firms and 
workers. vVhen going into business, a firm requires certain resources to post a 
vacancy and thus attract workers. A worker must spend his time to look for a 
job. Entry is costless for a firm but a vacant position costs c units of output. 
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Workers and firms meet through a matching function depending on the nurnber 
of employment vacancies, v, and the current stock of unemployed workers, u, 
where J.L measure.s the matching efficiency and 'ri represents the unemployrnent 
share of the total number hired. Define labor market tightness as the ratio of 
vacancies to unemployment, e = v/u, then the rate at which an unernployed 
worker meets a firm is expressed as 
and the rate at which a firm meets a worker as 
Upon each matching, the firm-worker pair produces output p, commonly known 
by both agents and draws upon match-specifie utilities. The firm preserves a pro­
ductivity ( while the worker receives an amenity 1/. Both ( and 1/ are idiosyncratic 
shocks, drawn from two specifie cumulative distribution functions F(E) and G(II) 
in their support [~; E] and [.!::'.; D], respectively. These shocks have a common Pois­
son arrivaI rate À. The assumptions listed below fundamentally determine the 
bargaining mechanism and constitute the model's key elements. 
Assumption 1 A worker, either employed or unemployed} and a firm bargrLin 
over a wage w} by means of take-ü-or-leave-it offers. 
Assumption 2 A firm has a probability ,8 of making an offer wJ to a workeT} 
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and a worker has a probabitity 1 - f3 of making an offer Ww to a firm,3 
Assumption 3 An employed w07ker gets involved in the negotiation if a À shock 
hits him or his employer white an unemployed does 50 if he receives a job offer. 
Continuing with Assumption A.1, rejecting an offer puts employed workers directly 
in the unemployment pool and unemployed workers remain there. The model 
also rule out the possibility for employed workers to switch from one employer to 
another, and no exiting to an inactive pool takes place. 
3.4.2 Steady state values 
Let J(E) and V be the net current values of a matched firm and a vacant finn 
respectively. J must depend on E, but V does not because in the previous sec­
tion We have established that only the matched firm-worker pair, and not the 
vacant one, can generate private shocks. Given the above assumptions, the value 
functions for both types of firm must satisfy 
r J (E) P+ E - W + À [E pfirm - J (E)], (3.1) 
rV = -c+q(e)[Epfirm_vs], (3.2) 
where Epfirm is the firm's ex-ante expected surplus resulting from the take-it-or­
leave-it offers, defined by 
Epfirm = (1 - prob of separation) x E[J(f)] + prob of separation x V. (3.3) 
30ne can think of (3 as the number of offers initiatecl by firms when firms and workers 
sit clown to negotiate new wages. 
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For a matched firm, equation (3.1) states' that the flow return of being matched ­
the capital value of being matched times the rate of return on that value - equals 
the flovv profits plus the expected net value resulting from the bargaining process 
- the Poisson's arrivaI rate, À, times the net value, Epfirm - J(E). Similarly, the 
flow value of a vacant firm equals the flow cost of posting a vacancy position plus 
the expected net value resulting from the bargaining process. 
The steady stat: values of a matched worker, W (v), and an unemployed worker, 
U, can be defined in the same way, 
rW(v) w + v + À[Epworker - W(v)], (3.4) 
rU b+ f(B) [Epworker - U], (3.5) 
where Epworker, similar 'to equation (3.3), is the worker's ex-ante expected surplus 
resulting from the negotiation game 
Epworker = (1 - prob of separation) x E[W(v)] + prob of separation x U. (3.6) 
To summarize, an employed worker receives a wage paid w and a match-specifie 
amenity v while an unemployed enjoys his unemployment insurance b during a 
job search period. 
3.4.3 Job creation condition 
Given that the economy has an infinite number of firms and entry is costless, 
meaning that firms can freely enter into business if V - determined by equation 
(3.2) - is positive, and otherwise exit. "\Then in equilibrium with a finite number 
of firms posting vacancies, the net current value of an open vacancy must be zero. 
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Equivalently, 
_C_
q(e) = Epfirm . (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) is called the free entry or the job creation condition. Under an 
intuitive interpretation, the expected total cost of posting a vacancy - unit cost 
times the average duration of a vacant position - is equal to the expected benefit 
of filling it. 
3.4.4 N egotiation game and job destruction conditions 
According to Assumption A.2, each party's unilateral offer should be differentiated 
in detail. The negotiation game for a firm is symmetrical with that of a worker, 
so here We only describe a firm's unilateral offer. Before offering wf to a worker, 
a firm must identify the worker's reservation value, Vr , based on the distribution 
of his idiosyncratic shocks G(v). This reservation value is clefined by 
(3.8) 
That is, at V r , a workcr is indifferent between being employed and being unem­
ployed. Substitutions give 
V = -wf - ÀEpworker + (1' + À)U. (3.9)r 
Equation (3.9) provides a negative linear relationship between V r and wf, meaning 
that the higher the wage offered by a firm, the greater is the chance that the offcr 
will be acceptecl. Once V r has been defined, the firm's optimization problem can 
be written as follow5 
max[1 - G(vr )] x J(E) +G(vr ) x V 
Wj 
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subject to (3.9), 
where G(I/r ) = Pr[1/ < 1/,.] thus represents the probability of refusing the firm's 
offer. 
Since aH realizations of 1.J are bounded by its support, the firm's problem can be 
resolved through an interior solution and two corner solutions. The first corner 
solution G(I/r ) = 1, i.e., 1/1' = D, must however be ruled out because it would be 
incünsequential for the firm to offer a wage that is rejected by every worker. The 
second corner solution G(I/r ) = 0, i.e., I/r = ~, still exists, as a firm may offer a 
very high wage that none would refuse. This corner solution is thus 
wj°l' = (r + À)U - ÀEpworker - ~. (3.10) 
For the inte,rior solution case, i.e., 0 < G(I/r ) < 1, the F.O.C. with respect to wf 
is straightforward 
(3.11) 
This provides an intuitive interpretation: firms choose an optimal wage level by 
ensuring that the probability of marginal rejeetion times the firm's surplus equals 
the expected marginal value of continuation. 
Let g(//) = G'(I/) be the density function of 1/, the F.O.C. yields an implicit 
expression for the interior solution 
(3.12) 
where IIelvrl is Cbe hazarà rate of the distributIOn G eva.luated at I/r. G~ner­
ally, He [1/] = l~fv~), but we cannot explicitly solve for wtt unless we specify a 
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distribution function form for G. 
Assumption 4 A worker's match-specifie amenity 
(a)	 is drawn from an exponential cumulative distribution function, G(v) 1 ­
e-1'(v-~) } where 1 is a parameter, and 
(b) it has unconditional zero mean, E[v] = O. 
Assumption A.4 includes various advantages, thus simplifying our computation. 
First, 4(a) implies that HG(v) = 1, which is constant for ail v. Second, 4(b) is 
equivalent to!:!.- = -1-1. Third, the exponential distribution does not have a finite 
upper bound, j) = +00, meaning that it is a good reason for excluding the first 
corner solution. Finally, we arrive at 
(3.13) 
The interior solution is then unique and is an increasing function of E. It is obvious 
that when E, called the firm's border point, is high enough, the interior solution 
becomes the corner solution. Denoting this border point as Ê, it takes the following 
form 
Ê = (r + À) U - ÀEP - p + 21- l ,	 (3.14) 
where 
E P = E pfirm + E pworker (3.15) 
is thus the ex-ante expected joint surplus resulting from the negotiation game. 
Equation (3.14) is caUed the job destruction condition initiated by workers. Figure 
3.1 summarizes the firm's unilateral offer, showing in fact that low productivity 
firms, E < Ê, should offer a wage at least as large as the worker's reservation level, 
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1/ 
Interior Corner 
Conti uation 
Separation 
!!. '---- -"- E~ 
E , 
- E 
Figure 3.1 Firm's unilateral offer, the case of exponential distribution 
I/r (E) = Ê - E+ !!., in order to avoid separation, and that no worker would reject 
job offers from high productivity firms, E ~ Ê. 
For reason of symmetry, the second job destruction condition initiated by firms 
can be established as 
() = (r + À)U - ÀEP - p + 24J-l. (3.16) 
To obtain this expression, we also need to assume that E is drawn from an expo­
nentia.1 distribution F( E) = 1 - e-,p(~-s.) with an unconditional zero mean, where 
cp is a positive parameter. 
Equilibrium 
Definition A labor market equi!ibrium consists of a quadruple (e, Ê, v, U) SG.t­
isfying the job creation condition (3.7); the two job destruction conditions 
(3.14) & (3.16); and the unemployed value given by (3.5). 
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In Appendix B.1, we prove that the ex-ante expected surpluses, E pfirm and 
Epworker, are functions of both Ê and v. Once the equilibrium has been solved, the 
model provides certain features that differ from corresponding models found in the 
literature, including: endogenous wage distribution, and two types of separation 
(quit and layoff to uncmployment fiows). 
Accepted wage set 
When combined with wage solucions offered by workers, a complete set of suc­
cessful wage offers is determined as 
weor 
i if E2': Ê 
w int J if E< Ê & v 2': Vr(E) 
w= 
weor 
w if v 2': v 
w int 1V if v < v & E2': Er(V) 
where w~or and w~t are the corner and the interior solutions resulting from the 
worker's optimization problem. Depending on the realization of E and v, it should 
then be easy to obtain the wage distribution. 
Quit and layoff flows 
Let Q and L be the probabilities of rejecting job offers initiated by workers and 
firms respectivel.'/- In the firm offer case, Q is thus the separation triangle shown 
in Figure 3.1, as defined by 
(3.17)
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Similarly, 
(3.18) 
Appendix B.2 proves that Q is a function of Ê, and L is a function of v. Hence, 
the quit and layoff to unemployment fiows, QEU and LEU, can be calculated as 
QEU = À{3Q. (3.19) 
LEU = À(l - {3)L. (3.20) 
3.5 N umerical analysis 
3.5.1 Calibration strategy 
The model's parameters are calibrated on 0. monthly basis. Table 3,2 lists a sum­
mary of ail our calibration parameters. The aggregate productivity is normalized 
to 1, without any loss of generality. The standard monthly interest rate selected 
is T = 0.0041, providing a consistent annual D.S. real interest rate of around 5%. 
To calibratc the parameters in the matching function, we follow the strategy 
described in Chapter 1. We set the job finding rate f(e) = j.LBI-ry = 0.594. We take 
the elasticity of unemployment with respect to match estimated by Petrongolo et 
Pissarides (2001), 'T) = 0.5, for the matching function. We follow Pissarides (2009) 
to pindown mean market tightness in 1960-2006, which was 0.72, obtained from 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data since Decemher 2000 
and the Help-Wanted Index (HWI) adjusted to the JOLTS units of measurement 
before then. This implied the matching efficiency parameter j.L = f(e)/el-ry = 2.1. 
The IPUMS-CPS dataset we used in Section 2 to describe wage dispersion also 
provide data on reasons for unemployment. Among others, these reasons include 
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four choices: (0) not in universe; (1) job loser/on layoff; (2) other job loser; (3) 
temporary job ended; and (4) job leaver. Information in categories (2) and (3) is 
not clear enough to be classified, either in the quit-to-unemployment flow or layoff­
to-unemployment flow. Since category (0) represents the number of job holders, 
we refer to the layoff rate as the number of respondents in category (1) divided 
by those in category (0); and the quit rate as (4)/(0); so that they calculated 
as percentages of employment. From this classification, the monthly quit rate 
averages to 0.70, and the layoff rate averages to 1.11. We choose 13 to target the 
ratio of quit tolayoff flows (0.7/1.11=0.63) which gives 13 = 0.37. Given the flows 
in and out of employment, we set .\ = 0.043 ta. target the unemployment rate of 
5.9%. 
The most important issue is the choice of the two parameters used for the ex­
ponential distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, cP and f. We continue to use 
the IPUMS-CPS dataset to plot the wage density in Figure 3.2. As Mortensen 
(2003) notes: "Any interesting theory of wage dispersion must be able to explain 
the shape of as \vell as the extent of the dispersion in the distribution of wages 
paid across firms". Two moments of the wage distribution should be therefore 
taken into account: the ske\vness and the kurtosis. We define a new measure of 
skewness - the ratio between the distance from the 10th percentile to the median 
and the distance from the median to the 90th percentile, :;~j:~~. This measure 
of skewness i~ easier for us to draw the shape of wage distribution generated by 
the mode!. The resulting skewness ~;~j~~~ is 096. For the kurtosis, we use the 
standard formula and obtain a value of 77. We therefore choose a combination of 
these parameters to fit two wage distribution moments, the skewness and kurtosis, 
calculated in the previous section. We find one combination, cP = 5.5 and '{ = 2.4, 
properly suits the two moments, although the kurtosis (4.57) is still far from that 
shown in the data (77). 
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Figure 3.2 Hourly wage (real 2005$ reported individually) 
We use the unemployment benefits, b = 0.6 as in Chapter 1 and Ia.ter vary it in 
an effort to determine how sensitive our model's outcomes. Finally as a standard 
procedure, we set c = 0.56 to pindown the mean tightness e= 0.72 obtained from 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). 
The model generated wage distribution is simulated by draw 10,000 exponential 
random numbers for both the pair (E, //) and then a proportion (3 of the draws is 
used to generate wage observed by firm offer and the rest by worker offer. 
3.5.2 Simulation results 
We start by computing the model equilibrium in the baseline CaSf\ fnllowing the 
parameterization established in the previous section. The model equilibrium val­
ues are reported in the first column of Table 3.3. Both Ê and D are positive and 
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Table 3.2 Monthly parameters 
Parameter Meaning Source/target 
p=l Aggregate productivity Normalization 
r = 0.0041 Interest rate Annual US real interest (5%) 
À = 0.043 Private shocks' arrival rate unemployment rate 
f3 = 0.37 Firm's offer prob. ratio of quit to layoff ftows 
cP = 5.5 Parameter in F( E) Skewness & kurtosis 
1 = 2.4 Parameter in G(v) Skewness & kurtosis 
TI = 0.5 Unemployment elasticity Petrongolo et Pissarides (2001) 
/-L = 2.1 Matching efficiency Job finding rate 
c = 0.56 Vacancy cast mean tightness 
b = 0.6 Unemployment insurance Chapter 1 
significantly higher than S:. and 1!.- due to the take-it-or-leave-it bilateral bargaining. 
Notice that the value of unemployment, U = 317, is intrinsically meaningless in 
the model. vVhat we have to take into account is the net surplus of a worker, 
Epworker - U. The positive net surplus for both worker and firm reftects the fact 
that each party accepts the other's offer. 
The second part of Table 3.3 reports the model generated four wage dispersion 
estimators. Comparing to the highest value predicted by the standard model with 
on-the-job search, the present model provides a better result. The four estimators 
of wage dispersion significantly increase. Although the resulted mean-min ratio 
is only half of the level found in the CPS data, the mean-plO closely matches 
the data. But as the minimum wages reported by interviews are the subject 
of criticism as they are volatile, they are often replaced by the 5th and 10th 
percentiles in the empirical literature. 
We also plot the shape of equilibrium wage distribution in Figure 3.3. Compared 
to the one obtained from the CPS data, drawn in Figure 3.2, the shape generated 
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by the model is quite good, though, the left tail and the kurtosis of the distribution 
need to be improved. 
One of our concerns related to the model result is the chance of refusing an 
offer is very high as the probability of rejecting an offer stands about 90% in the 
firm offer case and 83% in the worker offer case. If we compare them with the 
estimated value based on the NLSY79 data on job offer (21%), then our model 
generated data are far from the reality. One can think the take-it-or-leave-it offer 
was responsible for this counterfactural result counteroffer because the possibility 
of counteroffer was excluded from the model. We could decrease Q or L by only 
increasing both cP and "Y at the same time, but this strategy would do more harm 
than good to the model's wage distribution properties. Indeed, by increasing these 
parameters, both the firm's and worker's border points Ê and î) would decrease 
when applying the two job destruction equations, meaning that there are more 
firms and workers who would prefer offering corner solutions, thus disturbing the 
standard shape for wage distribution. In other words, increasing both cP and "Y 
would lead higher productivity firms expanding their wage offers to the right, 
and higher amenity workers expanding their wage offers to the left, thus resuiting 
in a double-peak distribution. Perhaps the modei described in this paper only 
considers two sources of heterogeneity (firm productivity and worker utility) and 
ignore sorne other important forms of heterogeneity such as workers may not aH 
enjoy the same unemployment benefits. If so, the probability of refusing an offer 
is likely to be Im·ver that of the case where aH workers have the same income while 
unemployed. 
In section 3.3, we have seen the important l'ole of the unemployment insurance 
parameter in enhancing the mean-min ratio derived from the standard S(->A.fCh 
models. In this section, we also vary this value from the baseline case, 0.6, to O.l. 
The exercise is reported from the second column of Table 3.3 to fifth. OveraH, 
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Figure 3.3 Model generated wage distribution 
there are littre changes in the four wage dispersion estimators across various un­
employment income values: the range varies from 2.05 to 2.1 The reason for this 
can be explained as below. 
vVhen the parameter unemployment insurance decreases, a standard result follows: 
it decreases the worker's outside option (U decreases) and increases the net surplus 
from a match for both the firm and worker. This in turns lowers both firm 
and worker's reservation value as translated by the decreases in both Ê and ÎJ or 
equivalently the decreases in both Q and L. As a consequence, there are more firms 
offering high pays and similarly, more workers acccpting low wages. One might 
think that the immediate result shoulcl be that cutting unemployment benefits 
would disperse the distribution of wage while our simulation results show that the 
dispersion changes moderately. If we look at how wage offers react to change in 
unemployment insurance illustrated in Figure 3.4, this complementary fact might 
92 
RcspomiO 01 flfln ""8ge of10'" RCl;POnSè of wOr1ol(;r wagOo 01101'5 
195..--~--''-r---''::'---~--, 125r--~--'-..---"';:""--~---, 
," 
,.2 W (caMor' t 
ww('r1ICl'K>r~11 1 
'15 
, 85 
, 8 
1.05 
1.75 
095 
1.7 
0.9· 
1.65 
0.85 
1.50'-------:-:02,....---:0~.,--""0.•,....---:0"=-.6--------' O.60~-~0.2""'--""0"'.4--""'06,....---:0~.6--' 
Unemploymenlll1soranco Ul'l~mployrner"lt insural'lce 
Figure 3.4 Effect of change in unemployment insurance on wage offers 
exp1ains our latter result. 
Higher unemployment insurance makes high productivity employers (those offer­
ing high pay) more generous in their wage offers than low productivity ones as 
the 1eft part of Figure 3.4 shows a steeper s10pe of WR,ge as a function of un­
emp10yment insurance. This is due to the fact that more productive firms tend 
to retain their workers. Similarly, the right part of the figure shows that low 
amenity vvorkers (those requiring high wage) make more wage demands than the 
high ones. High amenity workers enjoy employment relationship and thus did 
not want any match breakdown experience even t,hough their outside option has 
been strengthened. Change in unemployment insurance therefore only changes 
the shape of wage distribution but not its dispersion. 
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Table 3.3 Equilibrium values & generated wage dispersion 
Baselinea 
b = 0.6 b = 0.4 b = 0.3 b = 0.2 b = 0.1 
E 1.05 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.95 
LI 0.58 0.54 052 0.50 0.48 
e 0.72 0.89 097 1.06 1.15 
U 317 308 305 301 298 
Q 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 
L 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 
Epworker - U 1.18 1.31 1.37 1.43 1.49 
Epfirm - V 0.68 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.86 
mean-mm 2.10 2.08 2.05 2.09 2.06 
mean-pl 2.06 2.01 1.99 2.02 2.00 
mean-p5 1.87 1.76 1.77 1.74 1.76 
mean-plO 1.59 1.49 1.53 1.50 1.53 
Skewness 0.99 0.97 1.03 0.95 0.99 
Kurtosis 4.73 4.67 5.16 4.57 4.6 
aThe labor market tightness, the skewness and the kurtosis of wage distribution are 
targeted. 
3.6 Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that search theory approach could analytically ex­
plain why similar workers are paid differently. In this case, heterogeneous firms 
becomes the source of wage differences. Quantitatively however, it has been proved 
to be unable to reach the residual wage dispersion level found in vèl,fious datasets. 
If asymmetric information was applied to match-specifie productivity for both 
employer and employee as described in this paper, then this mechanism might 
improve the ability of standard search models in amplifying frictiona.1 wage dis­
persion, though it does not reach up to the data levels. We have also shown an 
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interesting finding that unemployment insurance, if it was put asymmetric in­
formation context, plays almost no l'ole in determining both wage dispersion and 
unemployment fluctuations. This parameter however has been proved to crucial 
in both related literatures. 
More productive employers offer higher pay to attract and retain more workers. 
Similarly, workers with high utility from holding a job (not in the sense of high 
pay) are willing to offer low wage to stay in the match relationship. Employers that 
offer low pay and workers who requires high pay learn the lesson that their offers 
have a chance of being rejected. With the bilateral bargaining mechanic such 
as take-it-or-leave-it offer, the chance of rejection is even higher. So that both 
private information about match-productivity and take-it-or-leave-it bargaining 
helps to understand why sorne workers are placed in the low end of the wage 
distribution, while sorne others with similar characteristics in the high end of the 
wage distribution. Our results are consistent with the empirical work by Abowd 
(Kramarz et Margolis) who fiad that more productive firms pay higher wages after 
controlling for person effects and worker heterogeneity explains the majority of 
wage differentials within an industry. 
The asymmetric information is seems to be a realistic hypothesis, the employed 
bargaining mechanism employed might not however gain its popularity. One might 
suggest that this kind of wage negotiation can be applied to bad jobs but not eVf~ry 
jobs. Wage negotiation for good jobs are often subject to many conditions such 
as paid vacation, heath insurance or other benefits. In these cases, counteroffer 
certainly happens and wage can be ncgotiated not only for one time but also for 
several times. 
OIle of our results seems to be counterfactural is the unrealistic chance of refusing 
an offer. We could bring the model result doser to the data but doing so woule! 
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make the shape of wage distribution deformed. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROOFS AND STOCHASTIC PROCESS IN CHAPTER 
1 
A.1 Proof of equation (1.10) 
Omitting the subscript i, denoting the firm's output as a fUIlction of L by F(L) = 
p(Y~L)) Y (L) and applying the envelope theorem to the firm 's value function to get 
In the steady state, the required condition is that L' = L so tha.t 
éJV (L ) 1 [ '(') '( ) ] (A.1)éJL = T + 8 F L - w - w L L , 
where F'(L) = é)p(JFP y + p~) ~r = P~)yE~l. Inserting (A.1) into the first-order 
condition with respect to va.cancy yields the monopolistic price (1.10). 
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A.2 Proof of equation (1.12) 
Since the Nash solution provides the usual equaJity (3Ô~iL) = (1- (3)(W - U) and 
given (1.9), the ftow value of a unemployed worker is given by 
(3 /<; (A.2)rU = b+ f(B) 1 _ (3 (1 - 6 )q(B)"
e 
Combining the last equation with (1.10) and (A.1) concludes the proof of the wage 
equation (1.12). 
A.3 Proof of equation (1.18) 
Following the same procedure as in the case of deterministic productivity, i.e, 
applying the envelope theorem to the dynamic version of the firm's value function 
to get 
aVy(L) = _1_ [F'(L) _ w _ w'(L)L + (1 _ 6 )(1 _ <5 ) (ÀE aVyl(L') + (1 _ ÀaVy(L')))] . 
aL 1 + r y e S y au au 
For the sake of simplification, suppose that À6 is relatively small as compared to 
À, then 
Given the flow values of a unemployed worlœr l'tnel an emp!oyed "'orker are ex­
pressed in section (1.3.5) and the Nash sharing rule ô~lL) = (1 - (3)5y , the proof 
of equation (1.18) is therefore done. 
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A.4	 Stochastic process 
To simulate the dynamic version of the present model, consider now the stochastic 
process by which labor productivity follows as described in Shimer (2005) 
where y* measures the long-run average productivity, which is equal to 1, and 
x is an Ornstain-Uhlenbeck process with persistence parameter "( and standard 
deviation ç. The realization of x takes place on a discrete grid 
x E {-n6.. - (n - 1)6., ... ,0, ... , (n - 1)6., n6.}, 
where 6. > 0 is the step size and n :::: 1 is an integer number to ensure that the 
number of grid points is at least 3. When a Poisson shock À hits the econoiny, x 
changes to a new level x' by one grid point where 
x' = {	 x + 6. with probability ~ (1 - n~)' 
X - 6. with probability ~ (1 + n~)' 
That means the chance of moving down to a bad state is higher than the chance 
of moving up to a good state. To complete the process' characteristics, define 
~( = À/n and ç = V)..6.. These two parameters also characterize the behavior 
of y and setting "( = 0.004 and ç = 0.025 will pin down the autocorrelation and 
standard deviation of y. 
We solve the system of equations (1.19) and (1.20) recursively and obtain a vector 
of e. We then simulate the model by starting with an initial ein a given aggregate 
state and compute the initial unemployment rate given by the Beveridge curve 
(1.14). In the following step, 1212 levels of unemployment rate are randomly 
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generated and the first 1000 observations are discarded to eliminate any initial 
effect. The sample remains at 212 observations. corresponding to the number of 
quarters from 1951 to 2003. We log the data generated by the model and and 
detrend it, using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 105. This procedure 
is then repeated 10,000 times. 
APPENDIX B 
PROOFS IN CHAPTER III 
B.l Probability of rejecting job offer 
The probability of rejecting a job offer initiated by workers is thus the separation 
triangle shown in Figure 3.1 and is defined by 
Q = liG[Ê-E+~]dF(E), 
cP li [1 - e-Î(i-E)] E- rI>((i-E))dE 
1 - _,'_t-<,b(è-f) + _cP_e--Y(i-f). 
r-cP 'Y-cP 
Similarly, the probability of rejecting a. job offer initiated by firms is 
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B.2 Ex-ante expected surplus 
By definition, the firm's ex-ante expected surplus is equivalent to 
Epfirm (3E (pfirmlfirm offer) + (1 - (3)E (pfirmlworker offer)
 
(3 Jlrm offer J(E)dF(E)dG(v) + (1- (3) Jl,orker offer J(E)dF(E)dGfi-'~)
 
We need to compute J( E) in the firm offer and worker offer cases, while accounting 
for the interior and the corner solution in each party offer. When firms make wage 
offers, the interior solution implies that 
1 1J(E) =-­
r+ À, 
and the corner solution implies that 
1 1J(t) = -(E-Ê+-)
r+À , 
Vvhen workers make wage offers, the interior and corner solutions are equivalent 
to 
_l_(V - v+ E +.!.) if v < V
r+.\ <!>J(,) = { 
r~.\ (E + ~) otherwise 
Bence 
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By applying the same process, we can compute the worker's ex-ante expected 
surplus as 
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